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Dear Friends and Colleagues in Information Security Education 
 
Since the last Workshop on Education in Computer Security, we have witnessed a greater 
level of appreciation within the general population regarding the protection of information.  
Perhaps the clearest motivating factor for this is the threat of identity theft. Unfortunately, even 
though many guidelines regarding “safe” computing have been published in the popular media, 
the possibility of falling victim to cyber crime remains high.  Part of this is due to the increased 
sophistication of the attackers, but a major factor is the lack of user education. 
As educators we face numerous challenges: the education of professionals who will develop 
and maintain future security solutions, the education of other information technology 
professionals, and the education of the general population.  This workshop will touch on each of 
these groups. To achieve this, WECS serves two objectives.  First, it is a forum to discuss 
emerging concepts in information assurance education, and, second, it is intended to provide 
participants with practical experience in developing educational materials for use with 
CyberCIEGE, an extensible cyber security video game. 
Educators from across the nation have written excellent papers that are both informative and 
thought provoking.  We learn how information assurance can be incorporated into an 
undergraduate educational program, how attack tree modeling can provide a teaching framework, 
the challenges associated with teaching vulnerability analysis, and the use of visualization tools in 
laboratory exercises.  Several broad topics relating to the teaching of cyber ethics and context, as 
well as future directions in information assurance education, provide grist for lively discussion. 
The keynote speakers for the workshop address two interesting topics.  The first is system 
forensics.  Its treatment includes both traditional and non-traditional applications of forensic 
techniques.  Our second keynote talk describes how checklists can help educators teaching 
information assurance.  These can be used to help students analyze problems, to review the 
security of operational systems, and as a means to ensure that educational objectives are met.   
A feature of this year’s workshop is CyberCIEGE.  We are especially grateful to Michael 
Thompson, one of the principle developers of CyberCIEGE, for providing several afternoons of 
detailed laboratory exercises that will allow participants to create and tailor game scenarios for 
use in their classes. As part of this activity, Rivermind Inc. has made special arrangements for 
non-government WECS participants to have access to the underlying CyberCIEGE simulation. 
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We hope that the readers of these proceedings will join the conference organizers, authors and 
participants for future workshops and conferences on information security education. 
We are grateful for the work of the members of the WECS committees who volunteered their 
time.  The complexities of conference mechanics can be daunting. Thanks to the behind the 
scenes preparations of Naomi Falby, we can look forward to a beautifully orchestrated workshop. 
We are also grateful to Matthew Rose whose attention to detail has again led to the creation of a 
carefully constructed proceedings. We are also grateful for the laboratory support provided by 
Phil Hopfner. 
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COMPUTER FORENSICS IN THE CLASSROOM 
Keynote 
Chris Eagle 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Digital forensics is one of the fastest growing areas within the computer security field today.  
Digital devices continue to penetrate every aspect of our lives and digital crimes continue to 
become more and more sophisticated.   
The resulting demand for trained computer forensics analysts presents unique challenges to a 
computer science degree program. The computer forensics process is traditionally divided into 
five phases: preparation, incident identification/response, evidence collection, evidence analysis, 
and presentation of findings.  The hard “computer science” within this process lies primarily in 
the aforementioned evidence collection and analysis phases, yet it would be a disservice to our 
students to avoid the three remaining phases.  In this talk I will discuss the challenges of 
presenting a one quarter course in computer forensics that is both sufficiently broad to cover all of 
the requisite phases and sufficiently deep to provide the student with a solid scientific foundation 
in the field. 
_____________________________________ 
Chris Eagle is the Associate Chairman of the Computer Science Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. A computer engineer/scientist for 20 years, his 
research interests include computer network operations, computer forensics and reverse/anti-
reverse engineering. He has been a trainer and speaker at conferences such as Blackhat, Codecon 
and Shmoocon and is a co-author of "Gray Hat Hacking, The Ethical Hacker's Handbook".  In his 
spare time, he is the benevolent dictator of the Skewl Of Rewt, past champions of the annual 





UNDERGRADUATE COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATION 
A Report on our Experience and Learning 
Shiva Azadegan, Michael O’Leary, Alexander Wijesinha, and Marius Zimand 
Towson University 
Abstract: We describe our experiences from the first three years we have offered our track in computer security 
for our computer science major. We present the details of the track, including descriptions of the courses 
we have offered. We discuss the lessons we have learned offering the track, as well as the challenges 
that remain  
Key words: Computer Security Education  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Fall 2002 we offered our first course in our new Computer Security Track in the Computer 
Science major here at Towson University, and last year we graduated our second class of 
students. In this paper, we would like to describe our track and how it has developed as the 
program has grown. 
Our track in computer security is our traditional Computer Science major where our students 
choose specific courses in computer security for their upper level electives. The computer 
security portion of the track is centered on the following seven courses: 
 
– Computer Ethics, 
– Introduction to Information Security, 
– Introduction to Cryptography, 
– Network Security, 
– Application Software Security, 
– Operating Systems Security, and 
– Case Studies in Computer Security. 
By design, our track focuses on the technical, practical, and applied areas of computer 
security. This design decision was made in part because this is a track within our regular 
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computer science major; our students still take the core computer science courses like Computer 
Architecture, Operating Systems, and Database Management. The track courses are actually built 
upon the core courses.  Figure 1 depicts the prerequisite tree for these courses.   We also have a 
Master's degree with a concentration in computer security, but we will not discuss that 
concentration in this paper.  
 
Figure 1. Computer Security Track Prerequisite Tree 
Our initial approach to the design of our track can be found in [3,4]. Since then, a number of 
other approaches to integrating security into the curriculum have been presented. Perrone, 
Aburdene and Meng [15] present an informal survey of tracks and courses in computer security, 
while Tikekar [22] describes a new undergraduate track in computer security and information 
assurance at Southern Oregon University; see also [21]. Similarly, Dornseif et. al. [8,9] describe a 
data security program at a German university. A case study of the general process of information 
security curriculum development is presented by Bogolea and Wijekumar in [7]. 
As we enter the fourth year of existence for our computer security track here at Towson 
University, we have found that enrollment in our track has been healthy though small for a school 
of this size and has increased each year. Enrollment in our Cryptography course has increased 
from 15 in the track's first year, to 17 in the second to 21 last year. Enrollment in this course is an 
important barometer of the number of students who are entering the security track, as it is a 
prerequisite for the Network Security course, which in turn is a prerequisite for the Case Studies 
course; thus we recommend students in the track take this course early in their junior year. At the 
other end of the track is the Case Studies course, which is our capstone experience for the track, 
and taken in the spring semester of the senior year. Enrollment in this course was 5 in 2004, and 
nearly doubled to 9 in 2005; we expect that enrollment in 2006 will be even larger. Graduates 
from our track have been in great demand, and our former students have had little difficulty 
finding industry jobs quite quickly. Employers have been so pleased with our graduates, that they 
have contacted the faculty here directly, asking us to help them recruit more of our graduates. 
2. FEATURES CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF THE TRACK 
 
Based on our course evaluations and feedback from some of the employers of our students, 
the strong hands-on component of the security track has been the most valuable learning 
experience for our students.   The courses in the track are built upon the core courses in the 
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computer science program and they all have upper-level computer science courses as their 
prerequisite. Thus, students do have the theoretical knowledge, the maturity and good 
programming skills that are necessary to do elaborate and interesting applied projects.   Though, 
developing such projects is very time consuming for the instructors, we believe that is imperative 
for any computer security training.  
We also made the decision that the track to be focused and technical for the CS majors rather 
than broad and open to all; thus the students after graduating are skilled, confident and 
knowledgeable enough to be hired as information security officers.  
All of the courses in the computer security track use our dedicated computer security 
laboratory for lab exercises. This is a physically secured room with a local network that is 
isolated, both from the campus as well as from the Internet. Student access to the laboratory is 
allowed outside of class only to students registered in one of our security courses. There are a 
number of different approaches one can take to the design of an isolated security laboratories; we 
mention [11, 14, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26]. See also [10, 27] for distributed security laboratories. 
The lab itself contains 28 high end workstations running VMWare, and students do their lab 
work on virtual machines. One of the prime advantages of this approach is that it lets us use the 
classroom laboratory for a range of courses. Each class maintains their own set of virtual 
machines; changing the class is as simple as changing the virtual machines that are running. 
These virtual machines give our students the ability to experiment with a wide range of operating 
systems; We have used Windows 2000, Windows XP, Red Hat Linux, SUSE Linux, CentOS, and 
FreeBSD. VMWare also allows users to run more than one virtual machine on a host at the same 
time; we have run as many as six virtual machines simultaneously on one host. Further, because 
VMWare has the ability to set up virtual networks for the virtual machines on a host, we can let 
students set up their own small networks without the need for additional hardware. 
Our choice of a flexible laboratory based on virtual machines has some disadvantages 
however. For example, we have not been able construct complex network topologies for the live 
exercises in our case studies course that you will find in, for example, [14, 18]. We have also 
limited ourselves to Intel computers; we do not have virtual machines that simulate a Mac or 
network hardware like a router or switch. Despite these limitations, the security laboratory has 
been an essential component of the early success of our track. 
3. THE EXPERIENCES & LEARNING 
In this section we share our experiences and learning and discuss the changes that were 
consequently made to the track.  As explained in reference [3,4], two of the courses in the track, 
Computer Ethics and Introduction to Information Systems Security, were existing courses.   The 
former is a required course for all our students and the latter is an upper-level elective course.  
This section focuses on the remaining five courses in the track that were developed and taught by 
the authors. 
3.1 Cryptography 
The Cryptography course is, roughly speaking, structured into three modules: (1) symmetric 
cryptography, (2) public-key cryptography, and (3) protocols and other applications. The course 
has been offered four times in the Fall semesters from 2002 to 2005 and the enrollment has grown 
from 12 to 21 students. The required textbook is Introduction to Cryptography with Coding 
Theory by Wade Trappe and Lawrence C. Washington [23]. In what follows we focus on several 
teaching aspects that we think require special attention. 
Within the first module, some classical cryptosystems are covered such as: shift, affine, 
substitution, Vigenere, Hill, one-time pad ciphers (the module also discusses the most commonly 
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used modern cryptosystems, DES, with its variants, and AES). We found it appropriate to use a 
relatively slow teaching pace in the exposition of classical cryptosystems (2.5 weeks). The 
simplicity of these systems allows the student to obtain a good understanding of the main security 
issues that a cryptosystem has to address, of the capabilities of different types of attacks, and of 
some basic principles that stand behind the design of any cryptosystem. This section of the course 
is also used to gently introduce some mathematical techniques, such as modular arithmetic and 
some notions from probability theory. Even though elementary, many students are not familiar 
with such mathematical tools, and they have the chance to see concrete applications of what 
otherwise may appear to be just mathematical abstractions. 
We consider important that students understand and see the necessity of using rigorous 
mathematical formalism for the definition of security and secrecy as opposed to an ad-hoc and 
intuitive approach that does not provide any guarantees and is flatly hazardous in the context of 
cryptography. This is not easy to teach, however the one-time pad cipher allows for the 
exposition of Shannon secrecy and from here the instructor can make the transition to statistical 
security, and then to computational security. These notions, presented in the simple form of 
security against ciphertext-only attack, can be justified and illustrated with the classical 
cryptosystems that the students have learned. 
We have attempted to alleviate the feeling that the course is math-heavy. For this reason, there 
are no long compact periods of time completely dedicated to mathematics. The mathematical 
notions are always introduced in the context of their utilization in cryptography systems and 
protocols. For example finite fields are introduced just after AES, the necessary elements of 
number theory are presented in conjunction with RSA, El-Gamal, Diffie-Hellman protocol, and 
so on. 
The last module of the course on protocols and applications (such as bit commitment, zero-
knowledge proofs, secret sharing, digital cash, electronic voting, coin flipping by telephone, etc.) 
should be very attractive for the students, since they apparently imply “impossible” things 
rendered feasible through clever combinations of rather elementary mathematical notions that 
have been presented earlier in the course. Unfortunately, this module is rushed at the end of the 
course when students focus more on their project and on the preparation for the final exam. 
Consequently we never had the time to cover but one or two applications from the above list and 
we felt that the students did not digest all the subtleties of these applications. We think that it is 
possible to teach parts of the second module more aggressively and to insert some of the 
applications at different points in the course. 
The assignments, generally speaking, fall into three large categories: (a) math exercises 
needed to fix the notions and to develop mathematical skills, (b) concrete attacks on “small” 
implementations of the crypto systems and crypto protocols covered in class, and (c) exercises in 
which students are asked to analyze variations of crypto systems and crypto protocols and to 
reveal the weaknesses of the proposed variations. The textbook is a good source for exercises in 
the categories (a) and (c). 
The list of suggested projects takes into account that the course audience includes students 
that have little or zero programming experience. Thus the list includes: (a) several programming 
projects (such as the implementation of differential attack on a small version of DES, RSA, 
different signature schemes, etc.), (b) projects that involve reading recent research articles and 
writing a survey paper, and (c) projects that ask the student to design protocols for some 
cryptography functionality using concrete “real-world” objects such as boxes with different kind 
of locks, pebbles, etc. Such protocols are used in cryptography as physical metaphors for digital 
implementations of the functionality and serve as a first intuitive step in the design of the 
protocol. One example of such a project is the following. Alice has a number na and Bob has a 
number nb, both in the set of integers ranging from 1 to 100. They want to know which one has a 
larger number but they do not want to reveal any other information (or as little information as 
possible). They can use boxes and pebbles in their protocol. The pebbles are identical (they 
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produce the same sound when the boxes are shaken). Your task is to design such a protocol and to 
analyze it. In your analysis, consider the number of pebbles, the number of boxes, and how much 
information is leaked. Ideally, if Alice learns that, say, nb is larger than na, then, from her point of 
view, all the numbers larger than na should be equally likely to be nb. For example consider that 
na = 20 and that at the end of the protocol, Alice knows that nb is larger than 20, that is nb is one 
of the numbers 21, 22, …, 100. Then ideally Prob(nb = 21) = Prob(nb = 22) = … = Prob(nb = 
100). Solutions in which the probabilities are not equal but are close are acceptable (let’s say the 
difference of any two probabilities in absolute value is at most 0.01). 
3.2 Network Security 
This course covers the principles of network security, focusing on specific application areas 
such as authentication (Kerberos and X.509 certificates), email security (PGP and S/MIME), IP 
security (IPSec), transport layer security (TLS/SSL), and firewalls. The course begins with a 
general overview of common attacks and security mechanisms and services for attack prevention 
and detection, followed by a two-week introduction to basic cryptography. The required textbook 
is Network Security Essentials by William Stallings [19]. Students working in groups are 
responsible for a paper/presentation and completion of 3-4 assignments. The group size depends 
on enrollments; there are typically 3-4 members per group. In determining the course grade, the 
four components midterm, final, paper/presentation and assignments have equal weight. The 
course has been offered 6 times from Spring 2003 through Fall 2005, once as an independent 
study, and has seen a maximum enrollment of 10 students.  
The material covered in the course is fairly detailed and the objective is to provide students 
with an understanding of the various methodologies and security protocols employed in network 
security. Exam questions have included a combination of short answer, multiple choice and 
problems. 
The instructor assigns a topic for the paper to each group. Topics have included wireless LAN 
(802.11) security, cellular network security, denial of service attacks, and IP, ICMP and TCP 
vulnerabilities. The paper is written in a formal conference style requiring 4-5 pages in two-
column format. While the paper is not expected to be overly technical, it is to be written at about 
the same level of detail as topics covered in the course text. The paper also provides an 
opportunity to assign topics in network security that are of current interest and address new 
developments in the field. 
The assignments constitute the most interesting part of the course. For their first assignment, 
students use a socket program to implement the Diffie-Hellman exchange and transfer a message 
over a network encrypted using AES. They could write their own code, or use prewritten free 
software and tools available on the Web. Other assignments include using GPG and its trust 
model to transmit secure email, and using Snort to log packets, write rules and trigger alerts based 
on network protocols and message characteristics.  
When the course was originally proposed, SNMP security was included as a topic. However, 
since students would need some background in network management and SNMP, it was decided 
to drop this topic due to a lack of time. The system security aspects of the course are limited to a 
discussion of firewalls from a network viewpoint. The reason is that topics such as viruses and 
worms, intrusion detection and honeynets are covered in other courses in the track. Both SNMP 
security and system security topics could be assigned as topics for the paper.   
Network security has often been taught as a combined undergraduate/graduate course. This 
impacted the undergraduate course in that the material had to be presented at a somewhat higher 
level with a little more emphasis on the technical details. The differences in the level and 
background of the graduate and undergraduate students also created some difficulties. While the 
topics covered during lectures were the same for both courses, the graduate students were 
assigned additional papers for independent study and a semester project that was significantly 
22 Undergraduate Computer Security Education 
 
 
more complex and required a substantial amount of programming. Presently, the undergraduate 
course is not being combined with the graduate course. 
An issue that needs further discussion is that of prerequisites for the network security course. 
At first, a course in cryptography and a course in computer networks were prerequisites. 
However, since an overview of cryptography is presented at the beginning of the network security 
course, it was felt that the cryptography prerequisite may be omitted. Currently, only a course in 
computer networks is required. 
Overall, the course has been quite successful judging from end-of-semester student 
evaluations. Assignments that address IP/TCP vulnerabilities, IPSec, SSL/TLS and wireless 
security would be beneficial. Unfortunately, we have not yet found assignments based on these 
topics that are non-trivial and possible to complete in approximately two weeks. We would also 
like to include more assignments that involve programming and require students to understand 
code that implement network security protocols. 
3.3 Application Software Security 
The Application Software Security course introduces students to the security concepts in 
developing software applications. This course discusses design principles for secure software 
development, and some of the security issues in current programming and scripting languages, 
database systems and web servers. This course is the only one that has been taught by more that 
one instructor.  Three instructors with approaches varying from small number of hands-on 
projects and strong current literature research projects, to equal time allocated to lab and lecture, 
to completely lab-based, starting with the overview of Assembly language and run-time 
environment, have taught the course. The completely lab-based approach is being experimented 
during this semester (Fall 05), though we don’t have the final data, from the preliminary feedback 
of the students, they all enjoy the course greatly. We do firmly believe that like other courses in 
this track, a strong lab component is necessary.  Some of the topics and projects covered in this 
class include: 
 
– Buffer overflow – Students are presented with an in-depth discussion of stack and heap 
overflow problems and how to exploits are generated. The reading assignments include papers 
addressing the overflow problem, integer and format string overflow problems, methods of 
defense against buffer overflow and secure programming techniques to prevent buffer 
overflow. In the lab, students work with relatively simple programs with buffer overflow 
vulnerability and asked to write the exploits. Though our computer science majors do take a 
course in Assembly language, we found that our undergraduate students don’t have the needed 
skills to actually handle more challenging projects in this area.  
– Threat modeling – There is a good coverage of this topic in “writing secure code” [12].  
Microsoft has developed a tool [2] that is freely available and can be used to make the projects 
on this topic more interesting and challenging. Threat Modeling [20] provides a good 
reference for this project. 
– Authentication and authorization – we provide students with a broad overview of 
authentication, authorization and access control techniques. Java security model is presented 
here and students’ projects deal with using JAAS. Also we discussed Kerberos in details and a 
simple project dealing with configuring a Kerberos server in our security lab and using it to 
authenticate users for their projects. 
– Cross-site scripting and SQL injection – Students enjoyed the discussion of both topics. 
Students did team projects demonstrating these problems.  




3.4 Operating Systems Security 
 
The operating systems security course introduces students to operating systems security issues 
and how to secure a system, and it has Operating Systems as a prerequisite. When the course was 
originally designed, we allocated equal time to Unix and Windows systems. However, based on 
our experience, we spend more time discussing Unix system than Windows. First, we realized 
that our students are less familiar with the Unix environment than Windows. Thus, we had to 
spend few weeks at the beginning to discuss the Unix operating system. Second, there are much 
better textbooks, articles and resources available addressing Unix security vulnerabilities than 
those for Windows. We tried to cover the same topics for both systems, to reinforce the concepts 
and allow students to make a better comparison of the features.  
The coursework for this class consists of literature review, projects and exams. The students 
were assigned a paper each week to read and had to write a one-page review. Examples include 
“Security Report: Windows vs. Linux” [16], “Root Kits – An Operating Systems Viewpoint” 
[13], and “Leave no Trace, playing Hide and Seek Unix Style” [4]. Students very much enjoyed 
reading and reporting on these papers. 
For the exercises and projects in this class, students had root or administrator access to their 
virtual machine. There are 7-8 projects small team projects in this class in addition to the final 
term project that depends on its scope, and can be either an individual or a team project. The 
projects dealing with Unix environment include writing a password cracker program; creating and 
managing user accounts; installing, configuring and using Tripwire [2]; configuring a simple 
secure ftp site and creating “jails”; and hardening Linux project using Bastille. We also used the 
NSA Security Configuration Guides for Windows 2000 [1] and found them very helpful and 
complete.  
3.5 Case Studies in Computer Security 
The Case Studies in Computer Security course serves as the capstone experience for the 
security track. Only offered in the spring semester, it has Operating Systems Security and 
Network Security as prerequisites. This course has been offered twice, in Spring 2004 and Spring 
2005 to five and nine undergraduate students. It is a hands-on course that emphasizes defense, 
detection, and administration, and is arranged around a sequence of five or six competitive team-
based laboratory exercises in the security laboratory. In a typical exercise, four different teams of 
students design and construct their own network of machines. They can choose from a range of 
operating systems, but their resulting network is required to provide a suite of remote services 
like Web, SSH, or FTP to their competing teams in the laboratory. Each team is then provided 
with authentication credentials to one or more of the services offered by some of the other teams, 
with the conditions that 
 
– No team has root equivalent credentials on any machine from another team, 
– No team has all of the non-root credentials for any other team, and 
– No team knows which other teams have credentials for the services that they are to provide. 
–  
During the live portion of the exercise, each team must verify that the services provided by 
opposing teams for which they have authentication credentials are correctly functioning. They 
then try to illicitly gain access to all of the remaining services and the remote host itself, if 
possible. Once the live portion of the exercise has completed, students review their logs to try to 
determine who accessed their network, and whether they did so legitimately or illegitimately. 
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The purpose of the course is to give our graduates experience configuring and operating a 
network of machines in an unknown environment. Although attacks, and attack tools are 
described, the majority of the class time is spent learning defensive skills. Topics covered in the 
class include:  
 
– Account and password management. PAM, password cracking. 
– Logging and Auditing. Setting up a log server. 
– Simple reconnaissance techniques; ping, nmap. 
– Packet sniffers; Ethereal. 
– Intrusion detection systems; Snort. 
– Configuring common services: IIS, Apache, OpenSSH, WU-FTP. 
– Advanced reconnaissance: Null connections and NetBIOS enumeration, SNMP walking. 
– Backdoors: netcat, vnc. 
– Firewalls. Iptables. 
– Security analysis tools: Nessus, Microsoft baseline security analyzer. 
– Security configuration tools: Bastille, Microsoft IIS lockdown tool. 
For attacks, we present attack tools like Metasploit and the sniffer/password cracker Cain & 
Abel. The decision to give less weight to attacks and more weight to defense is not motivated by 
philosophical reasons, but rather by practical considerations. There is simply not enough time in 
the course to cover everything, and the purpose of the course is to teach potential security officers 
and system administrators- not penetration testers. For example, we have discovered as the class 
has been taught that it takes students a great deal of time- three or four weeks- to learn how to 
write good firewall rulesets, especially when they are to govern a realistic network with some 
complexity. 
As an example of our live exercises, let us briefly describe the course's final exercise. In it, 
each of the four teams is told that they are the IT department for a hypothetical company. The 
company has offices in three different physical locations and they need to be able to work 
collaboratively on projects. The company also needs simple web presence, and the ability to 
deliver documents to the public. Finally the company has a corporate partner that should have 
access to additional information not available to the public, as well as the ability to work 
collaboratively on projects. The role of the partner company will be played by one of the other 
three teams. With these general guidelines, student teams are free to construct their own network 
and choose what services they will provide to meet these business requirements. Students begin 
by designing their network; in addition to setting up workstations to represent each office, they 
set up a collection of servers to provide the company's public presence. The students also set up 
and configure one or more logging servers, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems. All 
together, the preparation takes around two weeks. In the live portion of the exercise students 
access the services provided by both their partners and their competitors. Once the live portion of 
the exercise concludes, students write a report where they describe what they did to their 
competitors, and more importantly what their competitors did to them. Their project grade is 
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primarily based on how well they set up their network, and how well they detect the attacks that 
other teams send their way. 
4. ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES 
Like all new tracks, our security track has had its share of administrative challenges.  
Scheduling courses needed for completion of the track has presented some difficulties. Currently, 
we are offering courses according to the following plan: 
 
– Fall: Cryptography, Network Security, Operating System Security 
– Spring: Application Software Security, Case Studies  
In the past, however, Operating Systems Security, Application Software Security and Network 
Security have been offered in both Fall and Spring. This has been due to several reasons 
including newness of the track, prerequisites, student demand, expediting graduation, and faculty 
availability.  
Another factor that has impacted scheduling in the past is the offering of combined 
undergraduate and graduate classes. During the first few semesters the track was offered, some 
classes had few students. This was to be expected until such time that new students in the track 
would become juniors or seniors and start taking the security courses. In fact, at the beginning, 
many students taking these classes were not in the security track. Some were not even computer 
science majors. This together with the combined undergraduate and graduate enrollments ensured 
that class sizes were administratively acceptable. Now that the track has been available for a few 
years and student awareness of the benefits of completing the track has increased, we expect 
reasonably steady enrollments in all courses. 
At present, there are only five faculty members teaching the security courses. All are tenured 
or tenure-track; one has a joint appointment in Mathematics and Computer Science; the others are 
in Computer Science. With the exception of Application Software Security, the same faculty 
member has always taught every offering of a given course. So far, this has worked out well, 
since the courses have matched the interests and expertise of the faculty. It also allowed courses 
to be fine-tuned and improved with each offering, and provided continuity. However, this 
approach presents difficulties in that faculty availability and track schedules may not always 
match. Although the department currently has about 24 tenured/tenure-track faculty members, 
most have interests in other areas of Computer Science and Information Systems, which means 
there is little flexibility in assigning instructors to security courses.  
5. FUTURE PLANS 
As we enter the fourth year of the track, we have begun a complete review of the track and its 
courses. Currently, we are considering a number of modifications and improvements to the track. 
They include: 
 
– Changing the prerequisite tree for the track. In particular, we are considering removing the 
prerequisite course in Cryptography from the Network Security course; this will reduce the 
size of the (lengthy) chain of courses that our students need to graduate. As it stands, 
Cryptography is a prerequisite for Network Security, which is a prerequisite for Case Studies 
in Computer Security; this long chain of 300 and 400 level courses has been a difficulty for 
students. 
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– We are assessing the contribution of the introductory course, Introduction to Information 
Systems Security, to the whole track.  This course provides a broad overview of technical and 
human components of information systems security.  Therefore, there is a considerable 
overlap and redundancy between this course and the remaining courses in the track We are 
considering the possibility of reusing the credit hours to design a new course. 
– We may want to designate one of the sections of computer ethics course for the security track 
students to specifically address some of the security policies and regulations. Right now, the 
Computer Ethics course is a general course for all of our majors, and we may want to use this 
course to emphasize the ethical issues that arise in computer security. 
– We are trying to forge closer connections between the different courses. Some topics occur 
naturally in different courses; for example firewalls and intrusion detection systems are 
described in both the Network Security course and the Case Studies course. We would are 
trying to ensure that the topic is covered in a complementary fashion in the two courses. 
Another issue that has arisen is the rapid pace of change in the field. Given the evolving 
nature of computer security, to what extent do course assignments and projects need to reflect 
ongoing developments? For example, the weaknesses of 802.11 WEP are well known. Should 
students be given a hands-on assignment using WEP and the interim WPA? What elements of the 
proposed 802.11i security standard need to be included? Should the topic of wireless security be 
assigned as a paper topic in the network security class, or should it be included as one of the 
topics covered in the lectures?  
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Abstract: This paper presents a framework for enhancing student learning about the vulnerabilities of information 
assets of a business enterprise using attack tree modeling. Using this framework, students get an 
overview of the methodology as well as learn how to implement it with a well-known list of information 
security vulnerabilities. As a result, students can provide input into threat modeling strategies and 
operating procedures and thus, increase overall confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer 
and network systems. The paper concludes by describing a corresponding system capability metric that 
a system administrator, student, or red team can use to test the vulnerabilities of the systems within a 
business enterprise.   
Keywords: Attack Trees, Threat Modeling, Intrusion Scenarios, Attack Scenarios, Business Enterprise, System 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For years, engineers have relied on the analysis of failure data to improve their designs by 
employing the engineering principle of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). The main 
goal of this principle is to identify risks and initiate concerted efforts to control or minimize these 
risks. By knowing the risks, the project plan can be created more realistically. 
FMEA techniques [1] help to identify failure potential in a design or process before it actually 
happens. This is done by following a procedure which helps to identify design features or process 
operations that could fail. This procedure requires the identification of all potential failures, 
including the causes and the effects of those failures. Using knowledge of the design, process, 
and/or system, estimates of the probability of these failures can be identified, together with the 
severity of the effects of the failure, and the probability of detecting the failure before it becomes 
critical.  
 
While engineers have historically been good at using failure data to improve their designs and 
systems, software engineers and information systems administrators have not. In general, IT 
professionals dealing with the security of systems do not use similar failure data - attack data - to 
improve their computer and network systems and the related components that are a part of those 
systems. The reasons for this vary from organizations that are weary of divulging such 
information (for fear of decreased public confidence), to fears that attackers will employ the 
attacks against their systems, to a lack of detailed and reliable data on attacks [2]. 
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Despite weariness on the part of organizations to disclose attacks on their systems, attack data 
have become more available in recent years, due in large part to the public and media’s increased 
attention on information security issues. In addition to the public and media interest in 
information security-related issues, other resources like the SANS Internet Storm Center [3] and 
Security Focus [4], as well as many Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERTs) and 
Coordination Centers (CCs) throughout the world bring together timely and comprehensive 
security-related information. These resources serve as a forum for in-depth discussions and 
announcements of computer and network security vulnerabilities. They detail what they are, how 
to exploit them, and how to fix them.  
Countless articles and research publications have been written detailing threat models that can 
be used to test the security of an enterprise system. The authors of these publications argue that 
understanding all of the different ways a system can be attacked can help IT professionals 
responsible for securing systems design and implement countermeasures, to thwart those attacks. 
In addition, if these same IT professionals can understand who the attackers are and what their 
abilities, motivations, and goals are, they can implement the proper countermeasures to deal with 
the real threats [5].  
A fundamental understanding of threat modeling can help system developers/integrators build 
robust and reliable systems. If they know the possible threats, they can use an attack tree to test 
their systems. For example, after building a Web site, a system administrator can readily apply a 
threat model to test it. The same is true of students learning about the vulnerabilities of the 
information assets of a business enterprise. By developing several attack trees (which constitute 
an attack forest of a business enterprise), students get an appreciation for the hundreds of possible 
vulnerabilities in a given enterprise system, and the challenges faced by system administrators 
when securing their computer and network systems. Ultimately, students would then use this 
model to further test the security of their systems. Several organizations, including The General 
Accounting Office and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, employ Red Teams to 
identify vulnerabilities in their information assets [6].  
2. TEACHING THREAT MODELING 
Students cannot build and test the security of computer and network systems unless they 
understand the threats posed to those systems. Therefore, it’s critical that students in Information 
Assurance (IA), Computer Science, network technology, and other IT related programs be taught 
not only how to design and build secure systems, but also how to identify the  means, motives, 
and opportunities of their adversaries, identify the threats posed to the systems they are securing, 
and ways to test it. 
When the above mentioned academic programs are infused with threat modeling concepts and 
implementation strategies for testing the security of systems, students can do more. They can 
extend the application of this framework to design systems that meet the security objectives of an 
organization, decide on trade-offs during key design decisions, and help reduce the risks of 
security-related issues arising during the implementation and operations phases. 
3. THE CLASSROOM ENTERPRISE 
The following is an example of how we introduced and enhanced student’s understanding of 
threat modeling. We asked students to compile a list of information assets managed by the 
university or a typical medium business enterprise. The list of information assets includes several 
Web servers and Database Management Systems for Payroll, Strategic Plans, etc. We then 
provided the students with 32 information system vulnerabilities including the Twenty Most 
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Critical Internet Security Vulnerabilities [11] and asked them to develop attack trees for them. By 
developing several attack trees which constitute an attack forest of a business enterprise, students 
moved from a conceptual grasp of threat modeling, to an appreciation for the hundreds of 
possible threats to a system, to the challenges faced by system administrators, to methodologies 
for testing the security of a system. 
3.1 The Adversary Model 
Before students are able to design, build, and implement secure systems, they must understand 
the means, motives, and opportunities of their adversaries [5, 9]. Salter, et al [9] developed an 
Adversary Model to help organizations thoroughly understand their adversaries and 
characteristics. This model characterizes adversaries in terms of their resources, access, risk 
tolerance, and objectives. The learning objective for students is that countermeasures are only 
needed for attacks that meet the adversaries’ resources and objectives, but to be useful, the 
countermeasures must also meet the organization’s needs for cost, ease of use, compatibility, 
performance, and availability. 
3.2 Identifying and Classifying Assets 
The task of identifying assets that need to be protected within an organization is one of the 
less glamorous aspects of information assurance. Unless an organization know its assets, where 
they are located, and what their value is, it’s difficult to decide on the amount of time, effort, and 
money that should be spent on securing them. In addition, organizations won’t know what the 
adversaries of their systems want until they've identified the sensitive information and related 
assets on those systems. Students should explore asset classification models, which can be 
categorized as follows: the identification of an organization’s assets, the accountability of those 
assets, preparing a framework for classifying those assets, and implementing the classification 
framework.  
3.2.1 The Enhanced Telecom Operations Map for the Telecom Service Industry 
Figure 1 can serve as an excellent resource to give the learner an appreciation for the 
processes required for managing and protecting a telecommunication business enterprise. The 
enhanced Telecom Operations Map (eTOM) has been developed by The Telecom Management 
Forum as a generic framework for organizing a telecommunication business organization into 
three major areas. The three areas consist of (a) Planning and Lifecycle Management of the 
Strategy, Infrastructure, and Product development; (b) Operations Management, and (c) 
Enterprise Management—Business Support management. Each of the three areas consists of 
computer systems, telecommunication networks and software that must be protected. The 
responsibility for protecting these assets falls on the shoulder of the chief security officer or the 
Information Technology (IT) department. As a result of mergers and acquisitions, there can be 
tens of software products just for the Billing operation. At one time, the former WorldCom had 
over 30 billing systems. Each billing system consisted of database management systems, Web 
servers, and accounting software. Other operations support systems (OSSs) consist of diverse 
software products. The eTOM framework provides an environment for students to identify OSSs 
to analyze for vulnerabilities.  




Figure 1. The Enhanced Telecom Operations Map® (eTom) (Source: The Telemanagement Forum) [15] 
 
3.3 Creating an Architectural Overview 
When students are creating an architectural overview of an enterprise system, they need to be 
explicit about what the network and related systems are designed to do, how they plan on 
engineering it to achieve that functionality, and what technologies are required to implement the 
design. This helps them identify the common technology-specific threats and implement solutions 
to overcome them [7]. In addition, having students create a diagram of how information flows 
throughout the organization allows them to discover the critical components and procedures of 
the enterprise system. The student can use the eTOM model in Figure 1 or the instructor may 
identify a similar map for another industry. 
3.4 The Sum of Its Parts 
Once students have an overview of the architecture of the enterprise, they can use it to break 
down the system into its constituent components. The more an organization knows about its 
system, the easier it is to discover threats against it. The steps involved in breaking down a 
system into its constituent parts starts with creating a security profile, that is, an analysis of the 
system’s strengths and weaknesses. Students will need to validate all data being sent across their 
systems. This includes a comprehensive examination of the trust boundaries of the enterprise 
network, the flow of data in and out of the enterprise, and any entry points into the system that 
will ensure that the flow of information is done in a secure manner [8]. 
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3.5 Identifying Threats Using Attack Trees 
The first step is to identify the threats that might affect an organization’s system and 
potentially compromise its assets. This includes identifying network, host, and application threats. 
Network threats can be assessed by having students investigate how the data passes through 
routers, firewalls, switches, and other network devices. Students need to understand the logic and 
syntax of these device’s configuration files. In addition, students need to be able to determine 
what it takes to get past or compromise each device. Host investigations should include common 
configuration categories applicable to all server and operating system resources (patches, 
files/directories, ACLs). Finally, students should examine the enterprise’s application software 
[7].  
There are other ways students can identify the threats to a given enterprise system, namely 
using a list of known threats [11] and using attack trees with attack patterns. We encourage using 
a combination of both to identify threats to a system. When only using a previously prepared list 
of known threats, the resulting threat list only reveals the common, known threats. Using attack 
trees, in conjunction with a list of known threats, can help identify other potential threats. 
3.6 Attack Trees and the SANS Top-20 Vulnerabilities 
An attack tree provides a method for representing attacks (and similar vulnerabilities) on a 
system in the structure of a tree. The goal of the tree is the root node. The leaf nodes represent 
different paths to achieve the goal. As depicted in Figure 1, a business enterprise typically 
consists of hundreds of information assets that are vulnerable to attacks. Each of these assets can 
be modeled as an attack tree resulting in an attack forest [5]. The root of each tree in the attack 
forest constitutes an event that can potentially damage the enterprise system and its related 
resource’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The SANS twenty most critical Internet 
security vulnerabilities provide a rich environment for the students to learn about well 
documented attacks [11]. The SANS top-20 2004 vulnerabilities consist of two top-10 vulnerable 
services in Windows and UNIX operating systems. The SANS top-20 list is updated annually and 
provides useful information about each vulnerability, systems affected, and how to protect the 
services. Students can use the protection measures to develop attack scenarios. 
3.6.1 The Mail Transport Service and Enterprise Service (NIS/NFS) Vulnerabilities 
Two of the twenty critical vulnerabilities identified by SANS are the Mail Transport Service 
(MTS) and the misconfigured enterprise services: Network File System (NFS) and Network 
Information Service (NIS).  
The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is one of the oldest Internet application protocols 
that employ Mail Transport Agents (MTAs) as servers to send emails from senders to recipients. 
Examples of these MTAs are sendmail, QMail, Courier-MTA, Postfix, and Exim. They are 
vulnerable to buffer/heap overflow attacks when they are not patched or when their patches are 
out of date.  An attacker can compromise the Mail Transport Service by exploiting open relays 
(i.e., a situation that permits the sender and receiver that are not part of the domain to send and 
receive mail). A third major vulnerability of the MTS is exploitation of non-relay problems such 
as misconfiguration of the user account database, thereby exposing the service to spam attacks.    
The NFS and NIS services are used in UNIX servers to hold directories of files systems and to 
provide locations of distributed databases respectively. They are vulnerable to buffer overflow 
attacks due to unpatched services, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and weak authentication. 
Given the goal of attacking either the MTA or the three sub-goals listed above, the student can be 
assigned to develop attack scenarios for the services using the approach described in the next 
paragraph. 
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3.7 Modeling an Attack Tree 
The Web server is one of the SANS top-20 most critical vulnerabilities due to add-on software 
modules such as CGI scripts, PHP bugs, servelets, etc. The process for modeling an attack tree for 
a Web server’s vulnerability is described in this paragraph. Since each tree has a root node that 
represents the attacker’s goal, and the leaf nodes represent different paths to the root, each child 
node represents the steps an attacker can take. Modeling the attack tree involves associating a 
logical AND and a logical OR with each node. In essence, a node of an attack tree can be 
decomposed into an AND or an OR node. An AND node or an OR node decomposition can be 
represented in graphical or textual formats. Figure 2 is a textual representation of one of the top 
vulnerabilities to Windows-based systems [11]: 
 
Figure 2. Web Server Attack Description 
As presented in Figure 2 above and stated earlier, a node of an attack tree can be decomposed 
into an AND or an OR node. Both the AND and the OR decompositions can be represented in 
graphical or textual format as shown in Figures 3 and 4 below. All the attack sub-goals (such as 
G1, G2, G3, …., G5) must be achieved for the exploit to succeed. 




Figure 3. A Graphical Representation of an Attack Tree described in Figure 2 
(G0 ≡ G1 ∩ G2 ∩ G3 ∩ G4 ∩ G5); (G2 ≡ G21 ║ G22 ║ G23) 
The attack tree in Figure 3 can generate 24 attack or intrusion scenarios [10] in Figure 4 
below. The 24 possible attack scenarios are: 
 
Figure 4. Twenty-four possible attack scenarios 
The realization that a simple Web server attack tree can generate 24 attack scenarios helps the 
student to understand the importance of developing secure software as a countermeasure against 
Web server exploits.  
3.8 Benefits of Documenting the Threats: From an Attack Tree to an 
Attack Forest 
Figure 3 is one of hundreds of vulnerabilities that make up an organization’s attack forest. By 
creating an attack forest, an organization not only has a roadmap for testing for both known and 
unknown vulnerabilities, but also a means to document the threats to their systems and assets.  
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Ultimately, the attack forest document for an organization will include; each threat; a 
description of the threat; the target of the attack; the risk of the attack; the techniques likely to be 
used in carrying out the attack; and a risk management strategy. For example, when dealing with 
a SQL injection attack, the target is the database and the technique is that the attacker types a 
command into a textbox that is automatically added into a T-SQL command without client-side 
validation. To counter this threat, one can use regular expressions to validate the user name, and 
use a parameterized query to access the database [12]. 
4. CHALLENGES 
Teaching threat modeling can be difficult for a number of reasons, each of which is described 
below. 
4.1 From Past to Present  
Organizations trying to protect their assets from attackers and current intrusion detection tools 
face a common problem: Being able to generalize from previously observed behavior to 
recognize future behavior, either malicious or normal.  
Signature-based misuse detection techniques are acutely prone to this problem, as are 
anomaly-based detection tools that must determine normal behavior that is not identical to past 
observed behaviors, in order to reduce false alarms [13]. 
By understanding this problem, students can use both advances in intrusion detection 
techniques and adversary models as ways to better understand who their attackers are, and 
ultimately, implement the proper countermeasures to deal with the threats. 
4.2 Input Data: Developing Attack Trees 
As stated earlier, there are multiple ways students can identify the threats to a given enterprise 
system. We encourage using a combination of known threats [11] as the basis for developing an 
enterprise attack forest. When combining known lists of vulnerabilities with attack trees and 
attack trees’ patterns, new vulnerabilities can be identified.  
5. FUTURE WORK 
If a simple attack tree (like the one outlined in Figure 3) can generate 24 attack scenarios and 
there are hundreds of attack trees in a medium-sized business, it is feasible to have thousands of 
possible attack scenarios. Most organizations do not have all the resources that enable their 
system administrators to exhaustively test all of the thousands of possible scenarios. We are 
working on developing a framework that will generate a sampling scheme that will provide a 
degree of confidence metric to aid systems administrators and Red Teams in selecting scenarios 
to test.  
At the conclusion of their testing and using the sampling scheme, the testing team will be able 
to claim, with a degree of confidence, that 90% or 95% or 98% of all the attack scenarios have 
been tested. We have successfully demonstrated the approach to resolve aircraft to aircraft in-
flight conflict scenarios and maneuver strategies for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
and in testing porosity of graphite composites at the Boeing Aircraft Company in Seattle, and we 
are optimistic of the potential success in the information assurance domain and its educational 
value in enhancing student learning.  
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ADDING WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY TO HOW 
Providing Ethical Context in Aggressive Information Security Labs 
Scott J. Roberts and Andrew L. Reifers 
School of Information Sciences and Technology, Penn State University – University Park,  
NSA Center for Information Assurance Excellence 
Abstract  Educators recognize that laboratory based computer security courses do far more for students’ 
understanding than purely theoretical courses. Laboratories with common hacker tools are invaluable 
for students in an Information Assurance curriculum. These tools help students better understand threats 
and the defense mechanisms needed to protect individual systems and entire networks from these 
attacks. Students greatly benefit from understanding the threats they are called to defend against, 
making them more effective protectors of enterprise or government networks. Conversely these labs 
offer students hands on experience with tools that could easily be turned and used against others. 
Through the use of situations that show ethical uses of these techniques students can have these 
beneficial experiences without becoming the very danger they are being trained to protect against. 
Key Words  Information Assurance, Ethics, Laboratory Exercises 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the growth of networked businesses and organizations many positive elements of society 
have branched out and begun to flourish into cyberspace. Commerce has fully embraced the 
Internet, and e-commerce is becoming more mainstream everyday. Even personal journals, now 
taking the e-form blogs, have moved into this world wide public forum. With nearly all 
information and an ever-increasing amount of financial transactions taking place online societies 
negative elements are sure to follow. Crime goes where the money is and thus the Internet has 
quickly given birth to a new breed of criminals. Using new methods to accomplish old goals, this 
new breed of lawbreakers function in a way that has never been seen before, functioning across 
borders and legal jurisdictions, far outside the realm of traditional law enforcement. The Internet 
has, to a limited extent, become the new Wild West: lucrative, expanding, and largely lawless. 
Many universities have joined the fight by beginning to train a new breed of sheriffs to protect 
this new e-territory. Like sheriffs of old the line between the criminals and the defenders of 
justice isn’t always as clear as good versus evil. Doc Holliday and Wyatt Earp probably rode the 
same breed of horses and rode in the same style as Billy Clayton and his band of outlaws. They’d 
have shot the same sort of firearms, using the same technique, loaded with the same ammunition. 
Holliday and Earp would have probably been just as able, if not more so, to plan a jailbreak, 
hijack a stagecoach, or even rob a bank. [1] While this should not be taken as advocating 
vigilantism in computer security courses it illustrates an intriguing point. In most respects, from 
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clothing to methods, the law enforcers were little different from the law breakers. Except for a 
small metal badge carried by the lawmen the only real difference between these very different 
groups was their motivation. The “how” of doing their job was nearly identical, but the “when”, 
“where”, and “why” was completely different. Many of the same “how’s” can be used as easily to 
protect as to attack ([2],[3],[4]). 
In very much the same way the digital sheriffs being trained by today’s universities, technical 
schools, and certification programs are learning in the same way.  Understanding how to lock 
down a firewall also shows a student how to cripple one. Teaching a student a tool that 
enumerates vulnerabilities to be patched also shows them how to enumerate vulnerable machines 
for exploitation.  Although dangerous when misused, these tools are still of great use to an 
information security professional, when used in the right context. How could law enforcement 
investigate crimes without understanding how they are committed? How could a police officer 
keep people safe if he isn’t capable of firing his weapon at a dangerous criminal? In the same way 
that a police officer understands the correct “when”, “where”, and “why” to fire his weapon, 
Information Assurance professionals should know the when, and where to use of techniques and 
tools they possess. This becomes especially relevant when discussing the use of malicious tools. 
2. CURRENT CURRICULUM 
At Penn State University much work has already been done to provide the best possible 
learning experience for future Information Assurance Analysts, Engineers, and Managers. Inside 
the School of Information Science and Technology the Information Assurance program works to 
educate these future leaders in many aspects of computer security. All Information Assurance 
students are required to take the standard set of introductory IST courses, including an 
Introduction to Networking, an Introduction to Databases, and two basic programming courses, 
one taught in the School of IST and one from the Computer Science department. Once this 
background is established the Information Assurance specific courses become available. All 
Information Assurance Track students are required to take the introductory technical course, 
Network Security, as well as the introductory policy and ethics course, the Legal and Regulatory 
Environment of Privacy and Security. In addition each student is required to take one additional 
Information Assurance related course of their choosing, such as Wireless Network Design and 
Security, Web Application and Database Security, or in some cases an independent study with an 
Information Assurance track professor. 
Laboratory requirements vary from class to class, though typically, as would be expected, the 
technical courses have a lab component. These laboratory times are conducted outside of class, 
and are generally dependent on the current lecture track, though this is not always the case. 
Students in teams of 5 to 8 people work together through a technical lab proctored by a Teacher’s 
Assistant (TA). These labs cover both malicious and defensive tools, giving students a basic 
overview of their setup and operation. Afterwards students are given a homework sheet with a 
few basic questions about the technology used and its operation. 
The current Information Assurance lab curriculum includes two weeks studying the attack 
tools Metasploit Framework and L0pht Crack Password Cracker. The other eight weeks of lab 
detail use of a piece of standard Cisco network defense appliances and technology. Weeks three 
and four teach the use and maintenance of a Cisco router, weeks five and six are spent learning 
the Cisco Pix firewall, seven and eight are a Cisco Intrusion Detection System, and the last two 
weeks round out the series studying a Cisco Virtual Personal Network appliance. All these labs 
were Cisco approved lab sessions also taught by a graduate student TA. 
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3. HOLES IN ATTACK UNDERSTANDING 
One of the biggest problems in any undergraduate Information Security/Assurance curriculum 
is balancing the many elements that need to be taught [5]. Computer security is a constantly 
evolving and changing world, defenders are being pressed to understand and deal with new 
threats, old threats revisited, and old threats subtly changed. At this point it becomes a struggle to 
keep up to date and decide what new issues need to be brought to the students attention and what 
can simply be left for them to discover once they reach their places of employment. On top of this 
is the difficulty of pacing a course correctly. Computer Security and Information Assurance cover 
a huge realm, from programming to policy, network administration to system configuration, and 
now spyware to spam [5]. It’s difficult enough for most classes to get through the defensive 
basics and how to develop security policy. It is often impossible to even begin the most basic 
overview of attacks such as buffer overflows, configuration exploitation, spyware, spam, and the 
many other challenges facing individuals, corporations, and governments. 
It’s quite understandable that defensive technology and the policy of running security in a 
corporate security is the priority of academic network security courses.  The vast majority of 
Information Assurance students will be working in defensive roles, protecting network 
infrastructures, not attacking other networks. With the exception of government run and funded 
Information Warfare, corporate penetration testing, and underground hacking competitions such 
as Root-Fu or Capture the Flag, very few students will ever put into practice the attacks they’re 
being taught to defend against [6]. This emphasis on defense while largely ignoring the intricacies 
of attack may be most practical in the short-term view it hurts students in the long run.  When 
Penn State Network Security students were asked the question: “Do you feel an understanding of 
techniques a malicious hacker would use will benefit you if you go to work in the Information 
Assurance field?” they unanimously agreed that understanding hacker techniques would further 
their ability to properly secure information.  The same survey also brought to light that a majority 
of the students actually took personal time after the conclusion of the attack lab sessions to do 
their own investigation into the tools taught. With this in mind, combined with how little is 
actually taught about the intricacies of the attacks they eventually will be forced to defend 
against, students realize that their education omits an important issue of security. In short, 
defenders can better defend when they have a firm, technical foundation into how the attackers 
will attack.  
4. JUSTIFICATION AND DUE DILIGENCE 
With students themselves clamoring for experience in this area the question truly becomes is it 
necessary? While courses should stimulate students’ interest these courses should also be 
applicable to the students after graduation. In my personal experience I have found skills in 
evaluating technologies and threats have been far more useful in the business world than my 
ability to configure appliances. Though defending the network is always the goal, training, 
firewall configuration, support for setting up VPNs, and instructions for getting an Intrusion 
Detection System tuned are available. When a company purchases such expensive technologies 
support for making them work is included. It takes a unique blend of experience, knowledge, 
contacts, and luck to be able to identify, analyze, and advise on today’s threats, this is a 
combination that is difficult, if not impossible, to teach. [2] Students can however be given a 
framework from which to continue their learning, and for that it is necessary to teach lab 
exercises detailing the use of malicious tools. Understanding the configuration of a device is 
simple, understanding the potential impact of an exploit or tool to an enterprise network is 
complicated. 
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Undeniably teaching malicious tools is a double-edged sword. There is a fine line between 
teaching students to understand a possible attack and giving them the knowledge to carry out such 
an attack [4]. With every hacker tool that is taught educators risk creating the very menace they 
are trying to teach students to defend against. This paradox begs the question, how is it that these 
tools can be taught without simply giving the defenders more to defend against. In order to 
properly educate students in both the concepts behind a tool and correct ethical use of the tool it 
takes more than simply demonstrating the tool, but also showing students how it can be used 
appropriately. [6] 
5. PROPOSED SITUATIONAL LAB CURRICULUM 
As a proposed solution to this dilemma development was started on a new form of lab 
exercise to find a way to not simply teach the “how” of using a tool, but also the “when, where, 
and why”. These labs use situations, mostly through involving valid auditing practices where 
similar tools would be used by corporate or government security teams to test their various 
defense in an effort to straighten their current position, not to compromise a foreign network [2]. 
This provides a way to help students understand that a given tool, while inappropriate, and 
probably illegal, to use without permission, can be a valuable asset when trying to keep malicious 
attackers at bay. This gives students a perspective to see that a tool is just a tool, and it is the 
user’s implementation of that tool which decides if it is used to improve and protect a given 
network, or attack and wreak havoc against an unsuspecting target. These situational labs also 
provide a more real life experience than simply setting up a router and answering a few facts in a 
corporate style threat analysis report as was the case in former labs. 
 The beginning of the lab is a fictional situation, or story, into which the rest of the lab takes 
place [5]. This story details a time when a tool might be used in a valid security improvement 
context. It may be a password strength audit for a tool like L0pht Crack, or testing the practicality 
of a newly installed firewall for a tool like NMap, or possibly doing a network vulnerability audit 
for a tool like Nessus. Students are asked to place themselves in the shoes of an Information 
Assurance Engineer at a fictional company and use these tools to find out how they can further 
protect the company. After a brief set of open-ended instructions that encourage exploration and 
experimentation students are given a set of goals that force the students to properly utilize the tool 
in the laboratory network environment. These goals fit the context, and help guide the students in 
solving the problem posed in the context. Students might have to use L0pht Crack to conduct 
their password strength audit to find what employees are failing to comply with company 
password policy. They might need to identify unnecessary open ports that the firewall technician 
failed to lock down by scanning it using NMap, or they could be asked to identify what machines 
failed to receive the latest Microsoft Update and still have critical holes using Nessus. Each 
context and problem is tailored to the tool being taught, giving students a perspective on “when, 
where, and why” to use each tool. 
Further reinforcement comes in the changes to the format and goals of the homework given at 
the end of each lab. Where past labs have had simple questions about typical commands or 
overarching concepts the new situational labs will continue in the fictional corporate context and 
require the students to submit their own audit reports. This requirement forces students to think 
critically as they would when employed by any real world corporation. The L0pht Crack lab 
would have homework that helps students craft an audit report detailing the amounts of 
passwords that complied and did not comply with standard company password policy. 
Furthermore students would create a list of users failing to comply and provide recommendations 
for remediation of these problems, as well as possible improvements to the policy as it stands. For 
the NMap lab a detailed report of the firewall box itself, what ports are left open, and any changes 
that should be made to the firewall policy would be expected.  To complete the Nessus lab a 
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report of patched and unpatched machines would be expected. This gives more of a real world, 
applicable end to the lab by getting students to complete the audit as would be expected, with a 
report to management detailing their procedures, findings, and remediation recommendations.  
After students progress through five such labs they are faced with a final capstone project 
before lab curriculum progresses to set of defensive lab with the same emphasis on real world 
context. Continuing with the idea of context being essential to properly help students understand 
the use of these tools students are presented with an interesting set of problems in what is by far 
the most open ended lab. Student teams are put in a situation where they are using the tools they 
have learned to conduct an open penetration test, given a target of significance on the network 
and must use the skills they developed using these various tools to take advantage of the 
vulnerable system. This is not a hack, but an audit, and as a result a similar report to the other 
tasks is required. Teams are asked to detail the approach they took, the steps and vulnerabilities 
they used to find their way to the goal, and most importantly, a detailed report of remediation and 
suggestions for securing this network against their attack methodology, as well as any other 
possible attack methodologies and approaches. 
The use of context and treating the lab like a real exercise are what gives students the “when, 
where, and why” that is lacking in traditional, procedure based labs. While a step-by-step walk 
through of a tool might give a student the barest amount of understanding about how to use a tool 
it is only the application of that tool that makes it valid. Further, in the corporate world, the use of 
a tool is only as valid as the results it generates, thus it is doubly important that reporting is an 
integral part of these lab exercises, reinforcing both the labs content, and giving students practice 
at producing these real world style reports. 
6. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
In creating a set of labs that mimics the context of real life security audits, realism is perhaps 
the most difficult, yet most necessary, characteristic to establish. Students must believe in the 
possibility of truly being faced with this type of challenge when they enter the working 
environment for them to fully apply themselves. As labs are continuously created they must 
constantly evaluate the realism and validity of the situation in which they are used, since simply 
teaching the tool without a realistic use situation defeats the entire idea of helping students 
understand the ethical use of these tools. Reporting templates must also follow the labs and 
uphold the continuity by making the reporting requirements accurate.  
Realism in the lab environment, especially for the penetration testing exercise, is essential, 
making the environment setup incredibly complicated and requiring careful planning. Care must 
be given to make sure that the objective can be accomplished using whatever group of tools is 
taught in a given semester. Furthermore, multiple attack methodologies should be valid for 
accomplishing the given goal. A true to life diversity of clients, servers, appliances, services, and 
operating systems should be represented. This is complicated by the need to make sure vulnerable 
versions of operating systems and services are in place in the environment, and that valid attacks 
and exploits are made available to the auditors, either by pre-configuring their testing host box, or 
by making the appropriate files available on a resource server or disk. 
The detailed reporting provides a challenge over past lab formats as TA’s are forced to not 
simply check objective, short answer questions, but instead to read and evaluate longer, detailed 
audit reports, where answers may vary greatly, but still be correct. This limits the ability for a 
professor to simply provide a key to the TA, and instead requires the TA to be extremely familiar 
and use their own judgment to evaluate the validity of various answers. Lab creators must provide 
clear guidelines that attempt to remove as much ambiguity as possible from their guidelines of 
answers and minimize the amount of subjective judgment that those grading the exercises must 
use. 




Information Assurance educators are faced with a difficult task in the years ahead. With a 
constantly growing need for Information Assurance professionals and a continuously changing 
realm of security it is a struggle to maintain both the correct body of knowledge and ethical 
attitude. Teaching malicious tools provides an essential part of developing a holistic approach and 
understanding to security. By giving students an understanding of attack methodologies and by 
allowing them to utilize the same tools malicious attackers use, students develop the holistic 
understanding of security that they desperately need. By teaching these tools in a context where 
students can use them ethically they understand not only “how” an attack succeeds, but “when, 
where, and why” that same tool can be used to keep the bad guys out.  Essentially participating in 
a class that teaches the “when, where, and why” is the sheriff’s badge of the new Wild West. 
This work was supported by NSF DUE-0416827, and by DoD IA Institutional Capacity 
Building at Penn State Grant.  
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THE CYBERCIEGE INFORMATION ASSURANCE VIRTUAL 
LABORATORY 
Mike Thompson 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Abstract: CyberCIEGE enhances information assurance education and training through the use of computer 
gaming techniques. In the CyberCIEGE virtual world, users spend virtual money to operate and defend 
their networks, and can watch the consequences of their choices, while under attack. These tutorial 
sessions will introduce CyberCIEGE to educators and information assurance training professionals. The 
IA training tool is provide to develop new scenarios. 
Key words: Information Assurance, Education, Simulation, Virtual World 
The CyberCIEGE project creates an Information Assurance (IA) teaching/learning laboratory. 
In addition to rigorous scientific foundations, it involves the application of abstract principles to 
the real world.  A hands-on virtual laboratory provides a dynamic and often surprising context 
where abstract principles can be applied and discovered.   
CyberCIEGE is an innovative computer-based tool to teach network security concepts. The 
tool enhances information assurance education and training through the use of computer gaming 
techniques such as those employed in SimCity™ and RollerCoaster Tycoon®. In the 
CyberCIEGE virtual world, users spend virtual money to operate and defend their networks, and 
can watch the consequences of their choices, while under attack.  
In its interactive environment, CyberCIEGE covers the significant aspects of network 
management and defense. Users purchase and configure workstations, servers, operating systems, 
applications, and network devices. They make tradeoffs and prioritization decisions as they 
struggle to maintain the ideal balance between budget, productivity, and security. In its longer 
scenarios, users advance through a series of stages and must protect increasingly valuable 
corporate assets against escalating attacks.  
The CyberCIEGE encyclopedia of security concepts contains a wealth of information 
assurance knowledge. Users can read the encyclopedia, or watch its instructional movies!  
CyberCIEGE supports many educational venues, from basic workforce awareness training to 
university classes. It can help organizations meet DoD Directive 8570 obligations for IA training, 
annual IA awareness refreshers, and appropriate IA education. CyberCIEGE contains support for 
the creation of tools to record and assess student progress. Best of all, CyberCIEGE is extensible.  
CyberCIEGE includes a language for describing its security scenarios. Using this language, 
educators may construct or modify scenarios that can then be played by students. CyberCIEGE 
was created by the Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (CISR) at NPS, 
and Rivermind, Inc., of San Mateo, CA.  
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1. WECS CYBERCIEGE INFORMATION ASSURANCE TRAINING 
TOOL TUTORIAL 
These tutorial sessions will introduce CyberCIEGE to educators and information assurance 
training professionals. A hands-on laboratory will allow participants to explore the IA training 
tool and learn to develop their own scenarios. Participants will receive a copy of CyberCIEGE for 
their own use. Workshop topics include:  
 
 
I. Introduction to CyberCIEGE  
Central concepts and abstractions 
Tool navigation and scenario demonstration 
Hands on play of a CyberCIEGE scenario 
 
II. Strategies for deploying CyberCIEGE for training and education  
Simple scripted training scenarios 
Virtual setting immersion scenarios 
Assessing student progress using automated log analysis 
 
III. Development and enhancement of CyberCIEGE scenarios  
Use of the Scenario Development Tool 
Tutorial to develop a simple new scenario 
Understanding CyberCIEGE virtual attackers motivations and means 
Reliance on game engine behavior vs. scripting scenarios with conditions and triggers 
Story telling to engage the player¹s emotions 





TEACHING ASSURANCE USING CHECKLISTS 
Keynote 
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Abstract: Industry, the government, and many other entities have expressed concern about the way schools are 
teaching programming. The central theme is that students do not learn how to program “securely.” 
Several proposals to improve the quality of programming involve checklists, or items that that students 
must demonstrate mastery of in order to achieve the appropriate goal (such as passing the class or 
graduating).  
Underlying these proposals is the goal of teaching assurance—building programs and systems that meet 
specific requirements—and making it a part of everyday work, as opposed to a specialized discipline 
applied only when there is time, or when there are specific assurance-related requirements. This raises 
several issues, especially when one is considering “security assurance.” 
What is “security?” The standard answer, “security is whatever the security policy defines it to 
be,” does not provide the guidance needed to develop a new student’s intuition about how to 
develop programs. Instead, one needs to focus on a specific set of security requirements. No 
single set covers all situations, but certain elements arise in many requirements. For example, the 
requirement that a program handle error conditions appropriately means that a student must write 
programs in which error conditions are detected. Buffer overflows may not cause security 
breaches (especially if availability is not at issue), but they do cause errors to arise. Thus, a better 
pedagogic question than “how can we teach students to write more secure programs” is “what 
principles should we be teaching students to enable them to write more secure programs, and how 
can we teach them how to apply these principles to specific situations?” 
This formulation recognizes that the term “secure programming” is imprecise because it 
means different things to different people, and in different environments. It also adds to our 
burden because we must teach students to evaluate situations and determine what “security” 
means in the specific case. This requires teaching principles. 
History plays a part in this. Early papers, such as the Anderson Report, described threats to 
systems and created a framework for addressing them. These are important not only because 
current technology implements many of the ideas, but also because the framework itself teaches 
one how to think about assurance. Consider the reference monitor, a “guardian at the gate” that 
controls access to a resource. This means that all accesses of the resource must pass through the 
reference monitor. Spaghetti code, which allows multiple paths of access without a rigorous 
examination of why each path of access must be present, leads to poor coding and (potentially) 
security problems. The reference monitor must be checked, to ensure it works correctly; this leads 
to the requirement of smallness, so it can be validated. Complexity may be required, but 
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unnecessary complexity is a weakness. Striving for simplicity, of style if not of content, is the 
mark of a good programmer. Finally, if an attacker can alter the reference monitor, or the data 
upon which it relies, that subverted control will allow unauthorized access to the resource. Hence 
the programmer must guard against such tampering, by (for example) checking error conditions 
to prevent attackers from exploiting them. From one framework comes several ideas central to 
protection. 
Over time, technologies change, and methodologies adapt to new circumstances. But 
principles do not change. They provide guidance for developing new methodologies and 
technologies. Because of the rapid pace at which our field, computer science, is evolving, 
focusing on principles and teaching students how to analyze situations, and apply these 
principles, is critical. 
Checklists have a part to play in this process. There are many different types of checklists. 
Such lists can provide guidance or specific items to consider, and may be used by a student or a 
grader (auditor). 
 
– A checklist can simply list items to prompt students’ memory, for example “check for 
possible errors and handle them.” The usefulness of this type of checklist depends entirely on 
the student’s ability to translate the items on the checklist into the particular domain in which 
the student is working. This list provides guidance, and the student is expected to look beyond 
the list as appropriate. 
– A checklist can list specific items that students are required to satisfy. These checklists are 
usually specific, for example “check the return values of all functions to ensure the function 
worked properly.” These checklists are useful for reminding the student about details, but risk 
the student performing the items on the checklist without considering their appropriateness, 
and not looking beyond the checklist for items that need to be considered.  
– A checklist can be used to aid in the evaluation of a student’s work, or of the result of that 
work. Again, this checklist is primarily a guide to the grader or auditor, who is expected to 
translate the generality of the items into specific criteria appropriate for the work. 
– A checklist can list specific items that the student’s work is to satisfy. Here, the checklist 
requires the assessor to determine if the item is met. If so, it is checked off; if not, the item is 
marked unsatisfied. The set of satisfied (or unsatisfied) items determines the score. 
The best checklists are derived from principles, and their items develop logically through the 
derivation of principles, methodology, and application to a particular domain, guided by 
experience of practitioners. This allows one to justify the checklist rigorously and to see how the 
principles strengthen the practice; assurance at its best. 
The type of education being sought, and the type of environment in which the checklist is 
used, determines the appropriateness of any particular checklist. Used properly, a checklist can 
enhance a student’s education; used improperly, that same checklist can hinder the student’s 
progress, as well as fail to achieve the goals of that student’s education. 
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EDUCATING SYSTEM TESTERS IN VULNERABILITY 
ANALYSIS 
Laboratory Development and Deployment 
Leonardo A. Martucci, Hans Hedbom, Stefan Lindskog and Simone Fischer-Hübner 
Department of Computer Science, Karlstad University – Sweden 
Abstract: This paper presents a vulnerability analysis course developed for system testers and the experiences 
gained from it. The aim of this course is to educate testers in the process of finding security weaknesses 
in products. It covers the four steps of a vulnerability analysis: reconnaissance, research and planning, 
mounting attacks, and assessment. The paper describes in detail ten different laboratory assignments 
conducted within the course. For each experiment, an overview and a description on how to run the 
assignment together with the expected knowledge obtained are presented. In addition, a course 
evaluation and lessons learned are also provided. 
Key words: IT security education, vulnerability analysis, assurance, laboratory assignments. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A constantly growing number of security vulnerabilities, threats and incidents has increased 
the efforts of IT and Telecom industry to invest in the development of more secure systems. A 
lack of security functionality and security assurance bears high risks for IT and Telecom vendors 
as it can, for instance, result in high costs for patching running platforms on the clients’ sites, 
dissatisfied clients due to security breaches and system downtime, as well as reputation damage 
for the vendors’ clients.  
Vulnerability Analysis (VA) is an important means for improving security assurance of IT 
systems during test and integration phases. The approach that VA takes is to find weaknesses of 
the security of a system or parts of the system. These potential vulnerabilities are assessed 
through penetration testing to determine whether they could, in practice, be exploitable to 
compromise the security of the system. The Common Criteria have requirements on VA to be 
performed for the evaluation of systems with an Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2) or higher 
[0]. 
For improving security of their platforms before deployment, a major telecom company 
decided to increase their efforts in VA performed in their test labs, which requires well-educated 
software testing personnel. This company decided to outsource the education and training of its 
employees in the area of VA to an academic institution with experience in both VA and 
education. For that purpose, a compact VA course was developed at our department to be held 
during three working days for an international and heterogeneous, in terms of knowledge in the 
security area, group of software testers from industry. The emphasis of this course was put on 
practical, hands-on experiments in VA. The course was first held in spring 2005, with 16 
participants, and two times more in fall 2005 with 15 and 14 participants, respectively. 
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Penetration testing had been employed by our group in the past to evaluate network-based 
computer systems. Our intent with the test performing was primarily to find quantitative measures 
of operational security. Students from an applied computer security course were engaged and 
trained to attack a target system and evaluate its security [0]. Experiences and lessons learned 
from these supervised student experiments provided us with some inputs for the preparation of 
this VA course. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, the course content is briefly presented in section 2. 
Second, we provide a detailed description of the hands-on experiments, explaining the purpose 
and goal of each laboratory assignment and the knowledge that participants should obtain from 
those experiments in section 3. We present the lessons learned from the teachers’ point of view 
and a summary of the course evaluation in section 4. Finally, we present our concluding remarks 
in section 5. 
2. COURSE CONTENTS 
As mentioned in section 1, the VA course described in this paper was developed primarily on 
request from the industry. The requested course was aimed for software testers with no or little 
knowledge about security in general and vulnerability analysis in particular, but with an extensive 
knowledge in software testing. Since the target group was practitioners, a practical course was 
requested. 
The list of topics included in the VA course was, naturally, agreed with the contractor. The 
contractor had presented us a preliminary list of topics that should be covered by the course. This 
list was later transformed into a content list and a laboratory set that was discussed with a 
contractor’s group composed of software testers, software designers, managers, industrial 
researchers and security experts. A three-day course (24 hours course) was selected as the best 
choice for the course length, since the testers should not be absent from their tasks for a long 
period. The course also includes a follow-up one-day recycling class after one year to update the 
participants about newly found vulnerabilities and VA tools. Approximately 30 to 40% of the 
course covers theoretical aspects and 60 to 70% is used for practical assignments. The latter was 
intended to give the attendees hands-on experience on how to conduct a VA of either a software 
component or a complete system. The course is structured in four blocks covering the theoretical 
part with hands-on assignments providing support to the theory. The course is divided into the 
four following blocks: 
 
a) Introduction to Computer and Network Security. This block includes motivation, terminology, 
evaluation criteria, an overview of security standards, risk analysis, ethics and course rules. 
b) Computer and Network Security Protocols and Tools. It covers cryptography, pseudo-random 
number generation and testing, public key infrastructure (PKI), firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), virtual private networks (VPN), IPSec, SSH, and SSL/TLS. This block also 
includes the assignments presented in sections 3.3 to 3.5. 
c) Vulnerability Analysis. An in-depth description of VA four distinct steps, i.e.: reconnaissance, 
research and planning, attack mounting and assessment. 
d) Known Vulnerabilities, Reconnaissance Tools and Information Gathering. This block includes 
common host attacks, a short section on viruses, worms and anti-viruses, system hardening 
strategies and several practical assignments presented in sections 3.6 to 3.10. 
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The last assignment is a full-day final project final practical assignment that concludes the 
course, a “putting it all together” experiment that summarizes the full vulnerability analysis 
process. 
3. HANDS-ON ASSIGNMENTS 
In this section, we justify the selection of this list of experiments, present the learning goals 
and also describe how the laboratories were deployed, i.e. network topologies used, applications 
needed and operational systems employed. In addition, we describe how the knowledge obtained 
can be applied in the students’ working environment in order to improve the security of a 
delivered product. However, we first introduce the ethical rules, the laboratory environment and 
the preparations that had to be done before running the course. The laboratories are described in 
this paper in the same order as they were presented during the course, in order to follow the 
theory presented in parallel. 
3.1 Ethical Rules 
VA course teachers clearly instructed the participants that VA strategies and penetration tools 
must be used for testing purposes and controlled environments only, in order to avoid intentional 
or unintentional harm to others. Hence, for this VA course we set up the following ethical rules 
that participants were requested to adhere to: 
 
– Do not experiment with VA-tools without explicit permission of an authorized party. 
– Do not pass on/publish material, tools, and vulnerabilities to unauthorized parties. 
– Do not use your technical skills in criminal or ethically questionable activities. 
– Always report flaws to vendors/developers first. 
– Software tools provided in this course must only be used in a laboratory environment and on 
laboratory computers. 
3.2 The Laboratory Environment 
The laboratory is prepared for up to 20 students working in pairs. The workstations are dual 
boot - Windows XP/Linux and Fedora Core 3 Linux distribution - Intel Pentium 3 900MHz with 
256MB of RAM, with one auto-sense Ethernet/Fast Ethernet network interface card (NIC). Two 
additional workstations were configured as servers – one running Windows Server 2000 and one 
running Fedora Core 3 Linux – running various services. Servers are used in some, but not all, 
laboratories as target systems. Moreover, the server machines are also used to store image files 
for the other workstations, in order to fast redeploy images if necessary. 
3.3 Password Cracking 
Passwords are a very basic and common authentication method. Unfortunately, passwords are 
not the most secure way to implement authentication, but, on the other hand, passwords are the 
most practical and also less expensive way to implement it. Password policies are out of scope of 
this assignment, even though they should be mentioned during the theoretical part of a VA 
course. During the implementation phase, it is common that developers use some default 
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passwords for debugging and testing their applications before being delivered to integration and 
test teams in order to speedup the development phase. However, it is not uncommon that those 
debugging and test passwords are left in the application after the development phase is over. 
Those development and debugging backdoors are a serious threat to deployed platforms, as they 
can even grant full privileges. Detecting those built-in passwords is a must activity for testers. In 
this experiment, we go one step beyond detection, as students are encouraged to crack password 
files, in order to evaluate how easy it can be achieved with open-source tools. 
3.3.1 Running the Assignment 
In this experiment, students run a local password cracker application. There are several open 
source tools available for this purpose – our choice was John the Ripper v.1.6, a password cracker 
tool which main purpose is to detect weak UNIX passwords [0], since it is an easy to use and easy 
to deploy. We also provide synthetic (artificially populated) passwd and a shadow files from a 
Linux box. Before starting to use the tool, we provide students with some well-known rules that 
are used to choose good passwords, such as substituting letters for numbers, how to identify if 
passwords are encrypted with crypt( ) or hashed with MD5 and also the structure of password 
files. Finally, the students just have to unshadow the passwd file and run the John the Ripper tool. 
Since running the password cracking tool can take long time to run, it is advisable to have easy 
passwords added in the password file. Therefore, students can extract some passwords from the 
password file quickly.  
3.3.2 Knowledge Obtained 
Even though the experiment is more focused on cracking passwords, developers should first 
be able to detect if there are backdoors in the system, and, if possible, correct the problem and 
document it. 
3.4 Testing for Randomness 
Pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) are used in several applications with a very broad 
scope, from simulation and numerical analysis to gaming applications. PRNG are also a crucial 
cryptographic primitive and a flawed PRNG implementation can compromise the security of a 
whole system. A classic example was a PRNG flaw in earlier versions of the Netscape browser 
that could compromise the security of SSL connections [0]. Well-known PRNG have, in most of 
the cases, public algorithms and are submitted to several batteries of tests. In addition, the U.S. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) also has a list of approved random 
number generators applicable to FIPS PUB 140-2 standard [0]. However, it is possible that a 
programmer might use a flawed implementation of a given PRNG. Therefore, it is crucial for 
testers to identify weak binary sequences produced by a PRNG. This is the main goal of this 
assignment. 
3.4.1 Running the Assignment 
In this experiment, the NIST Statistical Test Suite [0] is used to evaluate outputs from 
different PRNG. It runs in Windows 32bit systems. It implements 15 statistical tests and also has 
embedded implementations of well-known bad PRNG, such as the XOR RNG, and also NIST 
approved RNG, such as the ANSI X9.31. Sample data files are also provided as companion part 
of this test suite. Even though other test suites, such as DIEHARD [0] and ENT [0] could be used, 
the NIST test suite is the latest and most complete test for randomness. Moreover, installing and 
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running the NIST Statistical Test Suite installation is straightforward and it is also freely 
available. 
Since generating sufficiently large files of random numbers is a time-consuming activity, the 
sample files available with the NIST Test Suite are used, since outputs from good and also bad 
PRNG are provided. However, our recommendation is to produce files generated using Java 
classes java.util.Random and java.security.SecureRandom beforehand and also with the rand 
function from C. Therefore, students can evaluate the output quality of those PRNG, which are 
popular among developers. 
Finally, since analyzing the outputs of the NIST Test Suite demands basic knowledge of 
statistics, it is crucial to provide to the students a short background on hypothesis testing before 
running the test suite. It is also important to briefly explain the tests and the test requirements as 
well, since tests have different requirements regarding the minimum number of samples and the 
minimum length (in bits) of each sample. 
3.4.2 Knowledge Obtained 
In order to evaluate if a given PRNG provide weak binary sequences, developers should 
inform and provide methods to call random number generator objects or functions in order to test 
them (if any are used) or, at least, document that a given PRNG is being used for security reasons. 
In addition, it is possible to verify if a given implementation of a given PRNG class produces 
weak binary sequences or not, and, eventually, validate a PRNG class. Furthermore, testing for 
randomness can be automated. 
3.5 Firewall 
Firewalls can be briefly described as filters that follow some screening policies defined by the 
network administrator. There are several firewall applications and boxes available in the market 
and even open source firewalls, such as ipTables. It is of ultimate importance for system 
integration teams to know how firewalls work, where they should be placed in a network 
topology and how their rules are defined and verified. The goal of assignment is to provide 
hands-on experience on such aspects. 
3.5.1 Running the Assignment 
This exercise is based on an assignment originally published in [0]. Students are divided into 
groups of two. Each group is given a description of a setup as the one described in Figure 1 and 
are asked to write firewall rules in Linux using ipTables implementing a given policy defined in 
the problem statement. Rules are written as if all the necessary NIC were present. Note, however, 
that the students are only working with virtual interfaces and not with two separate NIC. 
3.5.2 Knowledge Obtained 
When deploying systems that have a firewall, testers should be able not only to test the system 
from a black box point of view, but also read, understand, verify and evaluate firewall rules, in 
order to look for inconsistencies in the access control list. Therefore, hands-on experience is 
fundamental for testers in order to perform such tasks. 




Figure 1. Network topology for the firewall assignment. 
3.6 Black Box Test Method 
Communication protocols are basically defined in open and proprietary standards. Those 
standards are usually well-known and were evaluated by a committee and also by the users’ 
community. Therefore, finding out shortcomings in standards is not an everyday event. However, 
finding out vulnerabilities in implementations of communication standard is not uncommon since 
standards provide guidelines for implementing, but not for the coding. Thus, careless 
programming and also coding errors can lead to a series of vulnerabilities that can compromise a 
running system. Testers should therefore be able to detect such flaws in the communication 
protocols during test and integration phases. There are basically two ways to test the 
implementation of a communication protocol. The first is to extensively review the source code in 
order to find out implementation flaws, but this method is cost and time inefficient. The other 
alternative is the black box testing approach, i.e. a functional test method that evaluates a system 
from the input and output point of view in order to identify system vulnerabilities. It is important 
to testers not only to be familiar with those tools but also how to interpret results and draw 
conclusions from them. In this experiment, the students are encouraged to work in larger groups 
and execute a black box testing against a running system.  
3.6.1 Running the Assignment 
In this experiment the PROTOS tool [0] is used as a black box testing tool against the SNMP 
protocol implementation of Cisco 1005 router running IOS 11.1(3). The PROTOS Test Suite c06-
snmpv1 is used here to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the Cisco router. 
PROTOS c06-snmpv1 test suite [0] is divided into four separate test material packages: two test 
packages regarding packets with encoding errors and other two test packages regarding packets 
with application exceptions. Since PROTOS is a Java-based application, any OS can be selected, 
as long as a Java Virtual Machine is installed. Students were divided in two groups - each group 
with four workstations. The network topology used in this assignment (for each group) is shown 
below in Figure 2. 
The goal of this experiment is to check if the SNMP implementation of this router is 
vulnerable to a malformed packet generated using the PROTOS test suite and also identify the 
vulnerability type (i.e. test material, test group and test case), if it exists. PROTOS c06-snmpv1 
test suite documentation [0] is used to identify test groups. It is useful to provide a short 
introduction of the SNMP protocol PDU in order to provide some background information on this 
protocol. 
In this assignment students are encouraged to cooperate in order to find out if the router is 
vulnerable or not to SNMP malformed packets. All workstations continuously ping the router in 
order to check if it alive or not. No console access to the router is provided until the test case is 
identified. After the test case is identified – in the particular case of this router running the IOS 
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11.1(3), it is a basic encoding rule (BER) error in the length field of a Get-Request SNMP PDU – 
students are allowed to connect to the Router using the console port and witness the router 
crashing after receiving just one malformed packet. Basically, PROTOS just send one test case 
after another, but the running process doesn’t stop if the target system misbehaves. Therefore, 
students have to keep track of the echo reply messages, and follow PROTOS execution to finish 
this assignment. 
 
Figure 2. Network topology for the vulnerability test using the black box test method assignment. 
3.6.2 Knowledge Obtained 
Black box test strategy is very successful method to identify vulnerabilities in 
implementations of communication protocols. Automated testing tools are especially useful in the 
security evaluation of a given system because an entire test battery can be executed with a single 
command. The PROTOS test suite is a freely available tool, but few communication protocols are 
available – WAP, HTTP Reply, LDAPv3, SNMP, SIP and H.225.0. Additional test suites are 
available within Codenomicom [0], the commercial version of PROTOS. Using such tools, testers 
can quickly evaluate the robustness of protocol implementations and report vulnerabilities found 
back to the development team in order to fix them. 
3.7 Network Analyzers and ARP Spoofing 
Network analyzers are tools used to capture and analyze network traffic being transmitted in a 
given collision domain. These tools simply set the network interface card to promiscuous mode in 
order to bypass the MAC filtering rules. They are also very common tools for testers to evaluate 
the network traffic received and transmitted by a given system. However, testers also need to 
understand that some weaknesses are inherent to the protocol design. It is well-known that some 
protocols were designed with very little concern about security, such as FTP, TELNET and etc. 
Although the decision of using such protocols is not up to test and integration teams, they should 
be able to identify and report the existence of such protocols. A second part of this experiment is 
prepared in order to prove to students that knowledge of the networking device internals and 
network topology can impact security analysis. In the same assignment we also present an ARP 
spoofing experiment. The reason for this experiment is to prove to the students that some general 
affirmations about security are not true, and that skepticism and hands-on knowledge (in this case 
networking) are very important points in the security area. In this experiment we prove that the 
following assertion is incorrect: “Switched-based networks are obviously protected against 
network analyzing because each switch port is one collision domain”. Although this assignment is 
basically related to network security, its main goal is to prove that knowledge in network 
environment (i.e. topology and protocols) is definitively important to assess system 
vulnerabilities. 
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3.7.1 Running the Assignment 
The assignment is divided in three parts, each part with a different network topology. In the 
first part, students verify that a very popular network protocol, the TELNET, is very weak 
regarding security using a network analyzer tool. The main goal of this part is to introduce a 
network analyzer tool to the students. In the second part, a rather insignificant change in the 
network topology modify test results – and it is up to the students to figure out why changes 
occurred – and, finally, in the last part of this assignment students test an ARP spoofing tool on a 
switched network, verify the achieved results and explain those results according. In this 
assignment we deployed in all workstations Ethereal v.0.10.11 [0], an open source (license under 
the GNU GPL) network analyzer. Ethereal source is available for download, and installers are 
available for Linux Fedora, Unix Solaris and Windows 32bits systems. 
Ettercap [0] and Cain & Abel [0] are two flavors of ARP spoofing tools. Ettercap is an open 
source tool (source code is available, but no binaries) and have more features than Cain & Abel. 
On the other hand, Cain & Abel runs only in Windows 32bits platforms, but has a nicer GUI and 
it is easy to install, in addition, Cain & Abel is a freeware, but no source code is available. 
Therefore, the OS choice is up to the instructor. We considered that a better GUI is more 
important than a more powerful tool, at least from the didactic point of view, and, therefore, we 
picked Ethereal, Cain & Abel in a Windows 32bits environment. The three different scenarios 
created for this assignment are detailed next. 
3.7.1.1 1st Part: Network Analysis I 
The first part of the assignment has two goals: introduce the network analyzer (Ethereal) 
through a very simple scenario and also demonstrate that the design of some protocols have not 
taken security as a requirement – TELNET, a popular terminal emulation application is used to 
prove the assertion. All workstations and a Cisco 1005 router are connected to a 10Mbps hub. 
The instructor task is to access the router via TELNET. The network topology is depicted below 
in Figure 3. 
The experiment goal is to use the network analyzer to capture the access password and the 
privileged user password. Even though this is a very simple exercise, instructors should teach 
beforehand how to set and write filter rules in Ethereal. In order to demonstrate the importance of 
filtering, the instructor should keep a regular background network traffic – that can be achieved 
with a continuous ping from the instructor workstation to the router, for instance. 
 
Figure 3. Network topology for the network analysis assignment - Part I and Part II. 
3.7.1.2 2nd Part: Network Analysis II 
The goal of the second part of this assignment is to demonstrate that knowledge of network 
device and its internals can make difference on a VA test. The scenario is basically the same of 
the first part of this assignment, presented in Figure 3: a system administrator is configuring a 
router using TELNET. However, the network topology has slightly changed: the 10Mbps hub 
was upgraded by the system administrator to a 10/100Mbps auto-sense hub. 
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Before starting to access the router via TELNET, the instructor must force his network 
interface card to 10Mbps (without students noticing it). Therefore, TELNET traffic from the 
instructor workstation to the router will be send in the 10Mbps backplane. Since the NIC of the 
student workstations will be automatically set to 100Mbps, no TELNET traffic will be 
transported in the Fast Ethernet backplane of the hub, and, therefore, they will not be able to 
capture the traffic exchanged between the instructor’s workstation and the router, but they will be 
able to verify that the router is up and running using ping or TELNET. Students are then invited 
to think and explain why such subtle change in the network topology had dramatically changed 
the achieved results. The answer lays in the internals of the auto-sense 10/100Mbps hub. 
Since the auto-sense 10/100Mbps hub has two independent backplanes, one running at 
10MHz and the other at 100MHz, it also has two independent collision domains connected by a 
layer 2 bridge. Thus, the traffic between the router and the administrator’s workstation is 
transmitted only on the 10MHz backplane, but this traffic is not forward to the 100MHz 
backplane, where all student workstations are connected. 
3.7.1.3 3rd Part: ARP Spoofing 
The goal of the third part of this assignment is to prove that some common assertions on 
security can be proven wrong with a clear understanding of the subject – ARP (Address 
Resolution Protocol) protocol in the case of this assignment. A simple star topology is used, with 
student workstations interconnected to a switch. Since one MAC address shall be spoofed by only 
one machine per time period in order to capture the all traffic flow, and in order to allow all 
students to work in parallel, student workstations will spoof other student machines, in a logical 
ring topology. In other to create a constant traffic flow, students were instructed to continuously 
ping the workstation to their right or to their front.  
The target assigned for the ARP spoofing experiment is the ICMP echo request traffic flowing 
from the next workstation to the right to the one next to it. Therefore, students send to the next 
workstation to the right ARP reply PDU in order to update its ARP table with the attacker’s MAC 
address instead of the MAC address of the recipient. Figure 4 presents the ICMP echo-request 
PDU traffic flow chain, the ICMP echo-request target flow, the attacker and target workstation. 
The logical chain topology depicted in Figure 4 allows all students to work in parallel in order 
to optimize the time to run the assignment. With such kind of topology, students play the role of 
attackers and victims at the same time, since while they are poisoning the ARP table of their 
neighbor to the right, the other neighbor is poisoning their ARP table. Cain & Abel was used as 
ARP poisoning tool in parallel with Ethereal, which was used to capture traffic in the network 
segment. However, the main goal of the experiment is not just the understanding of how such 
attack is performed, since it is basically straightforward as soon as the students were told that 
ARP is a stateless protocol. 
3.7.2 Knowledge Obtained 
Network analyzers are powerful tools that testers should be able to master, since they can 
provide a good insight of the data being transferred from and to a running system. However, only 
mastering such tools is not enough without knowledge about the test environment, as proved in 
the second past of this assignment, and about the protocols involved, as demonstrated in the ARP 
spoofing experiment.  In addition, ARP spoofing is an easy to detect attack. The goal of this 
assignment is to demonstrate that a lot of myths in the security area are not true, and those myths 
can only be proven wrong with a good understanding of the target system and its running 
protocols. In conclusion, it is fundamental for testers to have a deep understanding and 
knowledge of the test environment and of the running system especially when testing for security.  




Figure 4. The ICMP echo-request traffic flow. 
3.8 Port Scanning 
Port scanners are used in the network reconnaissance phase of VA. Such tools basically scan 
one or more devices in order to find open ports that could be exploited for an attack. It is a 
fundamental task for testers to evaluate if unexpected open ports can be found in a system, 
especially during the integration phase of a system, just before deployment. 
3.8.1 Running the Assignment 
The goal of this experiment is gathering information about two running systems. Two 
workstations configured as servers (one Linux and one Windows server) are used as target 
systems. Students run Network Mapper (NMAP) [0], an open source port scanning tool, under 
Linux (however, it can be also compiled for Windows 32bit, since the source code is available). 
Servers run several network services, such as FTP, HTTP, NetBIOS (Windows server), etc. 
Students have to find and identify the servers in a given IP network range, since their IP addresses 
are not provided, find out the operational system running and identify the open ports in each 
server. The network topology employed is a simple star topology with all workstations and 
servers belonging to the same broadcast domain and in the same IP subnet. 
3.8.2 Knowledge Obtained 
Port scanners are reconnaissance tools usually employed by attackers in order to gather 
information about a system and identify open ports that can lead to successful break-ins. Testers 
should use such tools is order to identify unexpected open ports (i.e. ports that are open, but 
should not be), report them, and, eventually, terminate a process in order to close those ports 
during system integration phase. 
3.9 Node Hardening 
Part of the testing process is to test systems that are to be delivered and to do system tests of 
product. In that phase it is desirable that the testers make sure that the products are as secure as 
possible. One step in this securing process is to be sure that no unnecessary services are running 
and that the services needed run with minimal rights only. It is also vital to be sure that all the 
software used is patched to the latest patch level. The whole process is known as host hardening. 
Host hardening can be conducted in several ways, such as using checklists, experts in the area or 
software tools. 
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3.9.1 Running the Assignment 
Since the students have a heterogeneous background regarding in-depth knowledge of 
different operating systems, an open source tool for the hardening process was selected for this 
assignment. The chosen tool was Bastille [0]. It is a node hardening software that lets the user 
answer a number of questions on how they want to be configured and then configures the system 
according to the answers. In essence it works as a high level automated checklist. It can also be 
used to analyze the current configuration and give suggestions on detected suspicious or 
dangerous configurations. Students were asked to make there own computers as secure as 
possible given that it still should be functional as a networked computer. They were also told that, 
later on, they will use a security scanner to test how secure their systems were (section 3.10). The 
goal of this exercise is to provide to the students an understanding of the host hardening process 
and the phases that are part of this process. 
3.9.2 Knowledge Obtained 
Even though there are tools that can be used in the hardening process they still rely on in-
depth knowledge of the system that is to be hardened. It is also essential that these tools are up to 
date with the latest configuration files. Even though they can be a great help in the hardening 
process and also in the later verification of the hardening there are still a large manual portion of 
both these steps that require practical system knowledge. A system tester needs to know that in 
order not to be overly confident in the reports that these tools generate. 
3.10 Security Scanning 
A security scanner is a tool that attacks, or simulates attacks, on a system. The attacks it will 
perform are kept in a configuration file. The more up-to-date this configuration file is, the more 
accurate the scan. This means that an up-to-date security scanner will scan the system for all 
known vulnerabilities from the outside. Some scanners also have components that make it 
possible to perform attacks both from the inside and from the outside. A number of flavors exits 
but the most known ones are IS [0], Retina [0] and Nessus [0]. These tools are often a good 
starting point when doing a VA of a system since they automate the testing of the known 
weaknesses. The problem with these tools are generally not running them but rather how to 
configure the attacks and how to interpret the results, since false negatives and false positives in 
the attack process is highly influenced on the setup of the tool. 
3.10.1 Running the Assignment 
In this exercise, two target servers were set up. One Windows 2000 (set up as a domain 
server) and one running Fedora Core 3 Linux. Both not patched, running all standard services and 
acting as target systems for the security scanner. The Windows server ran IS and the Linux server 
ran Nessus. Neither the configuration nor the IP addresses of the servers were given to the 
students. The students were divided into groups of two. All the groups were asked to find the 
servers IP addresses and to find out which operating systems they were running. Students were 
also told that the servers were the only two network devices running an HTTP server in the 
network. After finding the servers, the students had to scan them and report all the vulnerabilities 
found. Finally, they were also requested to scan their own workstations in order to verify the 
hardening process that was performed earlier (section 3.8). 
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3.10.2 Knowledge Obtained 
These tools are a good help to the testers in the verification process. However, they cannot be 
fully trusted and will inevitably generate both false positives and false negatives. A good 
knowledge of the system is needed in order to be able to correctly interpret the tool outputs. A 
tester also needs a good understanding of the tool in order to configure it correctly and customize 
its behavior if it is to be used on a non-standard system or with non-standard services. 
3.11 Putting it all Together 
Finally, we let the students put all their knowledge together in a final “grain to bread” 
exercise. Our goal was to make this assignment as close to their reality as we could, in a 
controlled environment, with limited resources and time. 
3.11.1 Running the Assignment 
In this exercise, the students were divided into groups of four. Each group was given a Fedora 
Core 3 Linux server with all services running. Every group also got a requirement document 
describing the role of the server and the security requirements on it. They were asked to find out 
what needed to be done in order to fulfill the requirements and also to perform the changes and 
verify the results. In order to do this they had access to all the tools used in the previous exercises 
and a list of useful internet links. They also had access to the Internet and were told that they 
could use it freely. Moreover, they could also use any other freely available tool found on 
Internet. The students had to report all the miss-configured parameters, vulnerabilities and also 
had to suggest changes in the system in order to adhere to the specification. The results were 
discussed in a summing-up session just after the exercise. 
3.11.2 Knowledge Obtained 
This assignment provided to the students a wider insight of the highly creative art of VA and 
it further reinforced their conclusions from previous assignments that the combination of good 
system knowledge, good understanding of the tools internals and their shortcomings are essential 
in order to correctly interpret and test a system. 
4. EVALUATION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
In this section, we present the course evaluation according to our feedback from the students. 
We also present the lessons learned from the teachers and university staff’s point of view. 
Just after the course conclusion, the students received a questionnaire used to evaluate the 
course and the usefulness of the laboratories. The students were invited to individually answer the 
questions following a scale from 1 (lowest grade) to 7 (highest grade). They were also invited to 
comment their choice. No identification field was included in the questionnaire in order to 
provide anonymity to the students. A summary of the achieved results is provided in Table 1, 
regarding 36 returned questionnaires. 




Table 1: Questionnaire summary. 
Questions: Average Grade Standard Deviation 
Evaluation and usefulness of the assignment:  
      Security scanning 5.8 0.9 
      Port scanning 5.8 0.9 
      Node hardening 5.6 1.1 
      Black box test method 5.4 1.1 
      Password cracking 5.4 0.7 
      Network analysis (Parts I and II) 5.4 0.9 
      ARP spoofing 5.2 1.2 
      Putting it all together 4.8 1.2 
      Firewall 4.4 1.2 
      Testing for randomness 4.0 1.7 
Did the course fulfill your expectation? 5.1 1,1 
 
According to Table 1, it is possible to verify that seven out of the ten assignments of the 
course were highly classified by the students, being graded in the interval 5.2 and 5.8. They were: 
security scanning, port scanning, node hardening, vulnerability analysis using the black-box 
method, password cracking, network analysis and ARP spoofing. The reasons reported by the 
students included the usefulness of these assignments in real test environments and the easy and 
fast deployment in the tests. However, some participants were already familiar with some security 
tools and others reported that some of these assignments were not particularly useful in their 
specific tasks. 
Firewall, testing for randomness and the final assignment were considered the least interesting 
assignments, being graded between 4.0 and 4.8. Some considered that the time reserved for the 
final experiment was short, while others thought that it was no more than a sum-up of the 
previous exercises. However, part of the students considered it a good concluding exercise. The 
firewall assignment was considered not that useful because testers hardly evaluate or write 
access-list rules in general, so this experiment was down rated by the participants compared to 
other assignments. Finally, testing for randomness was considered hard to be implemented and 
most of the students were not comfortable with their background in statistics. Indeed, testing for 
randomness is a test were a security primitive is being tested, which is usually underrated by 
testers, that are more concerned in securing systems in an upper abstraction layer. 
To the question “did the course fulfill your expectations?” the average obtained grade was 5.1 
(with a standard deviation of 1.1), what was considered very good result from the teachers and the 
contractor’s point of view, regarding the heterogeneity of the audience. 
From the course backstage side, we noticed that having a system administrator available is 
essential during the course in order to provide assistance for the laboratories setup. This may 
64 Educating System Testers in Vulnerability Analysis 
 
 
alleviate the burden over the teachers, since a system administrator can redeploy images in the 
workstations or rebuild the network topology while teachers are explaining the assignments. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper presented the outline of a practical vulnerability analysis course developed for 
software testers with emphasis on the descriptions of its laboratory assignments. The course 
evaluation clearly shows that participants were very satisfied in general with the course, and we 
are convinced that the course has significantly raised their awareness concerning network and 
computer security in general and of vulnerability analysis in particular. 
However, we are not yet sure to which extent they use their new knowledge in their daily 
work with software and system testing. In spring 2006, during the one-day follow-up recycling 
class, we intend to investigate how the participants from the first course used their knowledge in 
vulnerability analysis when testing software products. In conclusion, we expect that the 
guidelines presented in this paper and the laboratory assignments are a very good reference for 
other academic institutions and industry to start a vulnerability analysis course in their premises 
in order to increase security awareness of their students and personnel. 
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computer security programs and address barriers to successful achievement of those goals. 
Keywords: Computer security education, computer science education, curriculum development, computer security  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer security became a tangible Computer Science sub discipline in the 1970’s as the 
need to protect information became important with growing computer use in government and 
industry. At that time computer security research was funded by the military and primarily aimed 
at the protection of sensitive information. Computer security researchers and practitioners were 
few in number, worked primarily in the defense industry, and were mostly self taught.  
Today, 30 years later, computer security is well established as an area of research and study 
within Computer Science. There are defined career paths for computer security professionals and 
an array of professional training and academic degree programs. If we compare the activity and 
interest in the field of computer security with its inception, one can say that a great deal of 
progress has been made. Yet, there is ample evidence that much more remains to be done.  
Popular press reports describe daily the number of vulnerabilities found and the latest abuse of 
our systems by individuals in search of easy profit. Tumbleweed Communications, an e-mail 
security provider estimates that two-thirds of all e-mail is illegitimate traffic [1]. Botnets which 
consist of hacker-controlled networks of thousands of hosts are one of the fastest growing 
menaces on the Internet. These networks are capable of launching DDoS attacks, untraceable 
spam relays and widespread malware attacks [2]. SEI/CERT has stopped reporting incidents since 
they feel that widespread use of automated attack tools are so common that incident counts no 
longer provide meaningful information [3]. 
Several well-respected Computer Security researchers and educators also question the state of 
our knowledge and practice as a discipline. Roger Schell describes how the lack of science in 
computer security has actually led to a decline in the number of secure systems from a peak in the 
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1990’s [4]. Eugene Spafford, also questioned the quality of security practice in his paper, A 
Failure to Learn From the Past [5]. Spafford recounts the 1988 Internet worm incident and points 
out that the same conditions that allowed the worm to wreck havoc on systems still exist in 2003 
nearly 15 years later.  
As security researchers, it is discouraging to see the low level of practice in the real world 
with the constant stream of new system vulnerabilities and the increasing number of malicious 
programs in search of one of the many unpatched systems. But, as educators, we are hopeful that 
in time, through education, we can improve the current state of computer security by producing 
students trained in secure coding, with knowledge of secure system design and operation.  
While there are multiple studies in the security education literature that document experiences 
of individual departments in developing academic security programs, there is at present no 
general study of security education1. Our motivation for this paper is our belief that a current 
overview of computer security education is needed in order to assess overall progress within the 
discipline and offer possible future directions. 
In this paper, we examine the state of computer security education from the past, present and 
future. We include views from three separate groups that have a strong interest in security 
education: academia, government and industry. We review the state of academic security 
education since 1997, the year of the first CISSE conference [6], in order to assess progress over 
the past eight years. We then evaluate the current state of computer security education plus 
provide personal insights from our respective programs in computer security. In the last part of 
the paper we discuss the future of security education in terms of goals and objectives and note 
possible barriers to progress. 
The paper is organized as follows: this section provides background and our motivation for 
the paper, Section two examines the progress made in computer security education in the past 
eight years, Section three presents the current state of security education and research funding, 
Section four describes our respective experiences in security curriculum development, Section 
five discusses the future of academic computer security programs and Section six concludes the 
paper by highlighting the future status of computer security education. 
 
2. COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATION IN THE PAST 
In this section we trace the evolution of government initiatives for academic computer security 
education over the past eight years. We provide statistics on the programs and the events in 
government that have influenced the overall progress of the early academic security programs. 
We also briefly mention the state of early academic programs. 
2.1 Academic Programs 
Early academic programs in INFOSEC education were primarily for graduate students. 
Consequently, undergraduates wanting to learn about computer security had to take graduate 
courses or do so through independent study. Graduate level security courses typically 
concentrated on Multi-level Security 2(MLS) concepts or simply covered cryptography without a 
lot of practical system analysis [23]. 
 
1 There are two CISSE keynote speeches by Matt Bishop in 1997 [23] and 2000 [24] that provide overviews of security 
education, but they are currently out of date. 
2 MLS handles the government's need for multiple classification levels for information such as unclassified, 
confidential, secret and top secret. 
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2.2 Government Support for Academic Programs 
The first NCISSE conference was held in 1997 and was established as a forum for dialog 
between government, industry and academia to define requirements for information security 
education and encourage development and expansion of information security curriculum at the 
graduate and undergraduate levels [6]. This conference was the earliest official forum to 
recognize computer security and bring together academics teaching security with key people in 
industry and government (Figure 1). 
Around the same time 1996-1999, President Clinton established the President’s Council on 
Critical Infostructure Protection (PCCIP) and subsequent President Decision Directive 63 
(PDD63) [7]. In establishing the PCCIP, the president recognized the vulnerability of the US 
infrastructure and acknowledged its importance to national security. PDD63 simply expanded the 
definition of critical infrastructure to include cyber security [7]. 
Soon after PDD63 appeared, in 1999, NSA established the Centers for Academic Excellence 
in Information Assurance (CAEIA) [8]. These centers were academic institutions with expertise 
in cyber security as demonstrated by a number of security oriented faculty and curriculum that 
met federal security training standards [8]. The purpose of this program was to increase the 
number of “security professionals of different disciplines”. During the first year, seven schools3 
were established and recognized at the Third Annual NCISSE conference [7]. 
In February of 2000, President Clinton released the National Plan for Information System 
Protection [9] which established the Scholarship for Service (SFS) program managed by the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) [10]. This program provided scholarships for undergraduate 
and graduate students for up to two years in exchange for an equal amount of Federal Job service 
upon graduation. In order for a school to obtain a scholarship program, they must first qualify as a 
Center for Academic Excellence [8]. During the first two years of the program, 150 students were 
enrolled [11]. 
In 2002, President Bush created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which united 22 
agencies into one common group for the purpose of improving homeland security. One of their 
responsibilities was and continues to be funding R & D for new scientific understanding and 
technologies in support of Homeland Security [12].  
In 2003, the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was passed by President 
Bush. It identified four major actions and initiatives for awareness, education and training which 
include [13]: 
 
1. Promote awareness nationally to empower all Americans to secure their own systems. 
2. Foster training and education programs to support national and cyber security needs. 
3. Promote private sector to support widely recognized cyber security certification and training 
programs. 
4. Increase efficiency of existing federal cyber security training programs. 
 
3These schools were: James Madison University, George Mason University, Idaho State University, Iowa State 
University, Purdue University, University of California at Davis, and University of Idaho. 




Figure 1. Timeline of Events Affecting Security Education 
From 1997 to 2003, the US government created many initiatives for cyber security which 
appeared to recognize its importance for national security and the continued well-being of our 
nation. However, the only money allocated to academic security education was from the NSF 
SFS program. 
3. COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATION IN THE PRESENT 
We now look at the present state of computer security education. We review the growing body 
of literature on established academic programs and discuss the typical approaches for establishing 
programs. Security education standards are discussed plus government and industry influences. 
3.1 Academic Programs 
Recently, a number of colleges have reported on their experiences adding computer security to 
their programs. Most schools appear to take one of two approaches: integrate security within 
individual CS courses [14, 15, 16] or create a special computer security degree or track4 
[17,18,19]. A few schools have opted for a combined approach where they have both specialized 
and integrated courses [20, 21]. There are reasons as to why a university chooses one approach 
over the other in their development of a computer security emphasis which often includes factors 
beyond the control of the institution. There are also tradeoffs with regards to these alternative 
approaches to computer security education.  
Schools that choose to create a computer security track or special degree appear to have 
faculty that have experience in computer security or are strongly interested in pursuing security 
training [20, 19]. There also appears to be department or institutional support for a Security track 
and at least enough funding for course development.  Integrating security into existing CS courses 
without offering specialized Security courses is one way that schools with limited resources in 
terms of faculty or funding can still offer security to students within their programs [14]. Faculty 
in these programs do not need not be retrained or develop completely new courses.  
The effectiveness of each approach relates back to the goals for the CS graduates of a 
particular program in terms of computer security expertise. Programs that want to produce 
graduates with strong computer security skills capable of obtaining a computer security position 
have created specialized programs in computer security. CS programs that want their students to 
have exposure to computer security but not necessarily produce computer security professionals 
can achieve this through an integration of security principles into existing CS classes.  
There is no clear evidence that specialized courses in computer security are superior to 
standard CS courses with integrated security components. However, schools that have chosen to 
integrate security within their existing curriculum point out several advantages over the 
specialized course path [14, 21]: 
 
4 Included are the schools that establish one or two specialized Computer Security courses 
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– Provide a security foundation to all their CS students as opposed to only those with a security 
interest 
– Security concepts are learned within the broader CS topics such as system design, network 
administration, and programming  
– The approach is available to all schools even those with limited resources and only requires 
faculty creativity and motivation 
3.2 Government Support of Academic Programs 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the government has several programs that currently support 
academic computer security education. Many of these programs were begun as the result of 
government initiatives related to national security. Here, we view the current status of these 
programs. 
NSA-DHS Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance [8] 
Current: Has 67 Centers in 27 states 
Started: 7 schools 
Funding: Provides no monetary support for the Centers 
 
NSF Scholarship for Service Program [10] 
Current and Future: 350 graduates by 2005 
Started: 150 enrolled 
Funding: An annual budget of $30.5 million 
 
The programs directly support Computer Security education within academic institutions. 
These programs appear to be thriving with an increasing number of Centers and students enrolled 
in scholarship programs. 
3.2.1 Research Funding 
In order to provide incentives for faculty and attract students into a field, the field of computer 
security needs a certain level of support in research dollars. Research fuels education by 
providing opportunities for faculty to publish, students to work on projects, and money to 
purchase equipment [23, 20]. Several long-time researchers and educators have noted that 
Computer Security needs a continued long-term commitment of basic research funding if it is to 
sustain itself as a viable area of study [22, 23].  
At the first NCISSE conference in 1997, Bishop [23], a computer security researcher and 
educator, discussed the need for long-term funding as providing a stable base of resources and 
people which could be drawn from without having to continually start from scratch. In a later talk 
at CISSE5 in 2000, Bishop commented that the government appears to be offering no support for 
basic security research which he states could ultimately prove disastrous [24]. 
Spafford briefed congressional staff in July, 2005 on the serious lack of funding in cyber-
security research [22]. Spafford’s group, the Presidential Information Technical Advisory 
Committee (PITAC)6, issued a report in spring of 2005 that condemned the meager government 
investment in computer security research. Spafford noted that the NSF has become the primary 
agency for funding cyber security research with an annual budget of $30 million a year. This 
 
5 Between 1997 and 2000, NCISSE was changed to CISSE which is how it is currently known 
6 The group was disbanded in June of 2005 
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translates to only 8% of proposals being funded which as pointed out by the Computer Research 
Association (CRA) is discouraging student entry into the field [22].  
The lack of long-term research funding was also noted by the Cyber Security Industry 
Alliance (CSIA), a group of security vendors who re-iterated PITAC findings in their own report 
[25]. The CSIA report stated that the Department of Homeland Security’s budget in FY05 for 
science and technology is over $1 billion but that the budget for cyber security is just $18 million 
or about .02% [25].  
Andy Birney, the editor of Infosecurity magazine, holds the government partly responsible for 
the nations’ current cyber-security problems. Birney claims that a lack of government investment 
in security research discourages PhD students from entering the field [26]. This in turn creates 
shortages of faculty trained in security at academic institutions that produce the students entering 
the work force as programmers. 
Another recent funding trend that affects computer security programs is the significant cuts 
from DARPA spending for university research [27]. DARPA has been a long-term source of 
basic Computer Science research funding for many years. This past year DARPA has cut the 
portion that goes to universities from $214 million to $123 million. They have shifted away from 
general research projects to more concrete deliverables produced in shorter time frames. This 
shift has resulted in a huge increase of proposals being directed towards NSF as one of the last 
Computer Science funding sources [27].  
3.3 Industry View of Academic Programs 
The computer industry comprises an important part of the United States economy, and almost 
all modern products and services use computer software.  In the Report of the 2nd National 
Software Summit, leaders from academia, industry, and government argued that software should 
be elevated to an issue of national importance with a goal of “Achieving the ability to routinely 
develop and deploy trustworthy software products and systems, while ensuring the continued 
competitiveness of the U.S. software industry” [28].  The Build Security In (BSI) Software 
Assurance Initiative from the Department of Homeland Security seeks to achieve that goal in 
collaboration with academia and industry [29].   However, few companies accept responsibility 
for the poor quality of software that exists in most commercial products.  Instead, some within the 
industry blame universities for producing programmers that don’t know how to produce secure 
code. 
Davidson, CSO of Oracle, appears to be a leading critic of academia [30, 31]. She believes 
academia should help shape the CS field and foster a culture of security. Davidson believes 
academia should produce CS majors that place more value on properties of safety, security and 
reliability above coolness and elegance. Davidson does not feel that industry should have to train 
programmers in security coding practices since they should have already acquired these skills 
prior to graduation [30]. 
Another group of software companies including Oracle and Microsoft, among others, 
discussed the failure of academic programs to produce security conscious programmers at a San 
Francisco Secure Software Forum in February, 2005 [31].  
However, others point out that academia can’t be entirely responsible for the problem of 
secure code. One panel member from the Secure Software Forum blames software companies that 
are still putting features above security [29]. The view that its partly industry’s fault that we have 
so much bad software is supported by Birney as mentioned in Section 3.1. Birney refutes the 
popular belief that the root cause of vulnerabilities is insecure coding [26]. He discusses secure 
coding from three perspectives: academia, industry and government. Birney believes that a lack 
of government funding for academic computer security programs leads to a shortage of faculty 
with backgrounds in security as was discussed in the previous section. Furthermore Birney shifts 
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some of the responsibility for vulnerable software to industry that still places development speed 
and profit over security. 
While many in industry seem eager to blame academia for bad software without doing 
anything to help the situation, Microsoft is an exception in that they are working to fix the 
perceived problem. In 2002, Microsoft shut down for several weeks in order to train its workforce 
in secure software development [32]. Furthermore, they are one of the few companies investing in 
academic education through their 2-year old Trustworthy Computing curriculum program. They 
are offering $750,000 in grant money to 15 universities to produce security related curriculum. 
The curriculum materials are then made publicly available on their web site. 
4. INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCES IN SECURITY PROGRAM 
DEVELOPMENT 
In this section we offer the authors' individual experiences in Computer Security program 
development. Each program is different and is representative of various types of schools that 
develop security expertise in CS. The University of Idaho represents a mature, long-term security 
program since they were one of the original designated NSA CAE’s. Indiana University of 
Pennsylvania is a more recently designated CAE (2002) and represents a less established security 
program. The computer security program at Northern Kentucky University is the smallest of the 
three and represents a non-CAE program that is mostly based on the efforts of a single faculty.  
In establishing security programs at all three schools there were several commonalities noted. 
All three schools noted some difficulty with a lack of computer security curriculum standards. All 
programs began as the effort of one (or a few) faculty who instigated the security effort. All three 
schools are not major universities with large amounts of funding, so these programs were 
established in spite of limited funding. Students at the schools appear to be very interested in the 
topic and enrollment in the programs continues to be strong. 
4.1 University of Idaho 
Information assurance curriculum development at the University of Idaho began in 1991 with 
the arrival of Dr. Jim Alves-Foss. Dr. Alves-Foss graduated from UC Davis with a specialty in 
computer security and became the first IA faculty at the University of Idaho. The first security 
course developed consisted of a combined upper division undergraduate and graduate course, in 
computer security that emphasized both theory and practical knowledge. The addition of a second 
IA faculty, Dr. Debra Frincke, in 1993 resulted in the creation of several more security courses, 
Network Security and a senior/graduate level seminar in Intrusion Detection. 
 These early courses were followed by a senior/graduate course in Survivable System 
Analysis, a seminar in Security Policies and a course in Exploit Techniques and Defense. Other 
CS faculty became interested in IA and assisted with the development and teaching of these 
courses. In 2004, several additional courses were added including Forensics analysis and a lower 
level general Security Course [33]. These courses evolved as the perceived need arose and as an 
outgrowth of faculty research interests.  
During the period of our curriculum development effort, we became an NSA CAE/IAE [8] 
and also participated in the NSF Scholarship for Service (SFS) program [10].  The NSA program 
has certain curriculum requirements which must be met in order to qualify for program 
continuance.  The NSA CAE/IAE designation is closely tied to the National Security 
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee’s, NSTISSI7 training 
standards especially 4011. In becoming an Academic Center of Excellence, the institution must 
 
7 In 2001, by Executive Order , NSTISSC was re-designated as CNSS, the Committee on National Security Systems. 
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demonstrate that their curriculum complies with the 4011 standard plus at least one other standard 
selected from the 4012 – 4015 documents [34]. Certification verifies that the college teaches 
skills that cover each of the seven topic areas of 4011.  
In 2005, we have also begun integration of security concepts within several of our standard 
CS courses. We are planning on introducing secure coding into our beginner coding classes plus a 
computer security integrated software engineering class. 
4.2 Indiana University of Pennsylvania 
Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP) was designated a Centre of Academic Excellence in 
2002. Since then, there has been noticeable improvement in curriculum development: 
In 2003, a Bachelor of Information Assurance degree, jointly offered by the Computer Science 
department and the Criminology department track was introduced.  
In 2005, a Master of Science in Information Assurance was recently developed. This is an 
interdisciplinary program designed to meet the industry and government needs for 
computer/network/information security professionals. The first offering will be in the fall of 
2006. 
 
– Through the NSF Cyber Security Capacity Building grant of 2001 – 2002,  NSA Capacity 
grant of 2002- 2003,  and the 2003 Cisco Equipment grant of $88,000, IUP established two 
isolated security laboratories, the Cyber Security and the Information Assurance laboratories, 
for teaching and research purposes. 
– Through the SIGSCE Special Projects fund and local IUP Senate funding, hands-on exercises 
for Information Assurance courses have been developed. These are being pilot-tested in the 
department. 
– To gain an industrial perspective of information assurance, industry partners provide guest 
lecturers on legal issues in Information Assurance classes and at the Information Assurance 
club meeting plus state police consultants provide guest lectures on legal issues. 
One challenge in computer security education is the lack of body of knowledge for the 
computer security curriculum. During the summer of 2003 we started a project on augmenting 
and improving the teaching of the Cybersecurity Basics course at IUP.  The Cybersecurity Basics 
course is an interdisciplinary course for the Criminology, Management Information Systems and 
Computer Science students. The course provides an introduction to the theories and concepts of 
computer security in host systems. The project involved 1) evaluating the effectiveness of host 
security tools in defending systems. 2) developing hands-on lab exercises based on the evaluated 
tools, and 3) integrating the developed hands-on lab exercises and the Cybersecurity theories and 
principles. Nine lab exercises were developed.  
The development of teaching materials for Information Assurance courses can be a challenge. 
Most of the hands-on exercises required for such courses are based on tools for intrusion 
detection, forensic analysis, vulnerability analysis, firewall setting up, router auditing and packet 
sniffing.  The challenge is that there is an abundance of CERT recommended security tools, tool 
version are changing often, and the teaching materials need to be continually updated.  
4.3 Northern Kentucky University 
Computer security curriculum development began at Northern Kentucky University (NKU) in 
2002 with the introduction of a graduate computer security course by Dr. Charles Frank.  
Undergraduates enrolled in the class as a senior-level special topics elective course.  The course 
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focused on security fundamentals and network security and included a variety of lab exercises.  
The math department also offered a cryptology class, in which many computer science students 
enrolled. 
In 2004, NKU added a new Computer Information Technology (CIT) degree with a track in 
Network, System Administration and Security.  An undergraduate class in computer security was 
added as a requirement for the new track and as an elective for both CIT and CS majors. 
NKU created a new College of Informatics in 2005, enhancing the ability of the departments 
of Computer Science and Information Systems to collaborate and hastening the pace of security 
curriculum development.  Faculty designed a shared core curriculum for computer science, 
computer information technology, and information systems, and began mapping NKU's computer 
security curriculum to the CNSS 4011 standard as a preliminary step to becoming an NSA Center 
for Academic Excellence.  The two departments will collaborate to offer a graduate certificate in 
Corporate Information Security in 2006. 
The addition of a second faculty member, Dr. James Walden, with prior experience teaching 
computer security at the University of Toledo, helped the Department of Computer Science 
design new classes in Computer Forensics, Network Security, and Secure Software Engineering.   
The department is also beginning to integrate secure coding techniques into classes with a focus 
on programming.  Building on the department's strengths in software development, a graduate 
certificate in Secure Software Engineering will be offered starting in 2006.  Future plans include 
construction of a dedicated network security lab and development of a Master of Science degree 
program in Secure Software Engineering.  
5. COMPUTER SECURITY EDUCATION IN THE FUTURE 
So far, we have addressed the recent past of computer security education, where we have 
been, and the present, where we are with regards to programs, government and industry 
involvement. In this section, we discuss the future, where we are going with particular attention 
to objectives and potential barriers to success.  
5.1 Computer Security Education Objectives 
In trying to visualize the future of computer security education, it is useful to set goals and 
define specific objectives for reaching those goals. No one in the security field would argue with 
the general belief that providing a security background is beneficial to all students graduating 
from CS departments. One overall goal would be to increase the number of CS graduates with an 
understanding of computer security principles. Consequently, one objective that would help in 
reaching this goal is to increase the number of CS programs that teach computer security. 
Analyzing the specific steps needed to realize the objective of expanding the security education 
programs leads to a discussion of barriers to success for computer security education, the topic of 
the next section. 
5.2 Barriers to Success for Computer Security 
Achieving the objectives of promoting or increasing security concepts in CS programs 
requires some investment on the part of both institutions and the faculty member(s). These 
respective responsibilities for faculty and institutions are outlines in Table 1. 




Table 1. Responsibilities for Promoting Computer Security 
Responsibilities 
Institution Faculty 
Reduced Teaching Load Learn Computer Security 
Travel and/or Training Support Grants Collaborate with Computer Sec. Research Inst. 
Tenure Support Travel to Conferences 
 
In addition to the specific activities of faculty and institutions that wish to add computer 
security to the curriculum, there are other possible barriers to establishing a computer security 
emphasis. These are outside the control of faculty and their colleges and include:  
 
– No standard for CS curriculum development 
– Lack of government funding in basic research 
– Limited industry involvement 
Each of the barriers is explained in terms of its relations to computer security education. 
There is currently no accepted standard for college level computer security curriculum 
development. This presents a barrier to the development of computer security programs. Without 
an accepted standard, departments must work harder to define course content [14, 19]. The lack 
of an academic computer security curriculum standard was recently studied by one of the authors 
[35]. That study noted the inadequacy of the 40XX Training Standards for academic programs 
and described the problems faced by academia in trying to map their curriculum to these 
standards.  
The lack of government funding was addressed in a previous section and noted as a 
disincentive for promotion of security education. If there is little or no research funding available 
in a given field of study, then there is no way to support graduate students who are to become 
future faculty and eventually promote their own research programs. Consequently, disciplines 
that lack research support struggle to recruit students and faculty since there is a perception of a 
lack of resources in the field. The current dismal situation where only a small percentage of cyber 
security proposals are funded by the NSF is not conducive to promoting computer security 
programs within academia.  
The software industry is concerned with the perceived lack of security awareness in students 
graduating from CS programs. Yet, they are not as a group volunteering to assist with this 
problem either by funding or other direct involvement. The objectives of the CISSE conference 
were to establish a working partnership between government, industry and academia [6]. Industry 
and government should provide better support for higher education. Yet, outside of the 
institutions with large, well-established programs, partnerships between industry and academia 
are not common. In addition to directly funding academic research projects, industry could 
provide a number of other opportunities. There could be an exchange of faculty and industry in 
internship settings in order to share expertise, students could benefit by working on real problems 
[23], industry could serve on Department advisory boards.  
6.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have provided an overview of computer security education. We presented 
government initiatives and other events from the past eight years, examined the current state of 
academic progress and discussed future objectives for promoting security within CS along with 
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the perceived barriers to success. There are a number of areas that need to be addressed in order 
for security education to progress. A lack of research funding in academic programs appears to be 
a major roadblock to the creation of a viable national security program. Faculty training along 
with institutional support appears to be a problem for programs that lack any faculty with a 
background in security. 
6.1 Future Work 
There is a strong need for a survey of CS and IT departments to determine current status, 
future plans and needs for security education. The University of Idaho is planning to survey 
schools that have mapped their curriculum to the CNSS8 40XX training standards to get feedback 
on their experience mapping their curriculum to the 40XX criteria. However this is intended to be 
a targeted survey and not a comprehensive survey of all CS departments.  
Other projects that would benefit security education include: 
– An academic curriculum standard for both undergraduate and graduate programs 
– Integration of computer security into accreditation programs (e.g. ABET ) 
– Support for schools beginning security programs 
– Curriculum help and mentorship from established programs  
Those who work in both security and education see promotion of security education for all 
graduating CS majors as one of the few concrete steps we can take that could favorably improve 
the state of cyber security. Ultimately, security education should increase the level of competence 
in our developers to produce better quality, more robust systems capable of surviving most 
disruptions, intentional or otherwise. 
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Abstract:  Visualization and animation have been used to graphically illustrate various concepts in computer 
science. This paper describes an animated simulator for packet sniffer.  The goal of this tool is to 
provide users with interactive tutorials and simulations to help them better understand the security 
concept packet sniffer and related computer networks concepts. This tool can be used in an introductory 
level computer security course or a computer networks course. It can be used by the instructor in the 
classroom, and can also be used by the students outside the classroom. This tool will be used in our 
institute and its effectiveness in teaching and learning will be assessed. 
Keywords: Computer science education, security, packet sniffer, animation 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Visualization has been used in computer science education in the fields of algorithm, 
computer networks, computer architecture, and operating systems [1-4]. The surveys of computer 
science educators conducted by the Working Group on “Improving the Educational Impact of 
Algorithm Visualization” suggest a widespread belief that visualization technology positively 
impacts learning [5]. It seemed that computing educators are convinced that visualization can 
make a difference in helping learners better learn the concepts.   
It has become increasingly important to provide today’s computing students with training and 
education in security issues. Universities have tried to incorporate security issues into computer 
science curriculum. In some computer science programs, some security topics are incorporated 
into existing courses. Others developed new, required courses to the computer science curricula 
[6, 7, 8]. Resources for teaching computer and information systems security at the undergraduate 
level will be useful for computer science educators [9].  
This paper presents a software tool that demonstrates the security concept of packet sniffer 
and related computer networks concepts through animation. It is intended to be used in an 
undergraduate level computer security course or a computer network course. To make this tool 
more beneficial, exercise problems are designed to improve learner’s involvement in learning 
with this tool [10]. We believe this visualization tool will help students better understand the 
packet sniffer and network concepts, improve student participation, and make teaching and 
learning more enjoyable.  
80 An Animated Simulator for Packet Sniffer 
 
 
2. PACKET SNIFFER 
Packet sniffer is a program that captures all of the data packets that pass through a given 
network interface, and recognizes and decodes certain packets of interest. A packet sniffer is 
sometimes referred to as a network monitor, or network analyzer. It is normally used by network 
or system administrator to monitor and troubleshoot network traffic. However, it is sometimes 
also used by malicious intruders for illicit purpose such as stealing a user’s password or credit-
card number [11].  
Typically, a computer in a network would only capture data packets that are intended for it 
and ignore packets that are not intended for it.  However, if its network interface is configured 
into promiscuous mode, the computer is capable of capturing all packets traversing the network 
regardless of the destinations of the packets. A packet sniffer can only capture packets within a 
given subnet.  
There exist various commercial and free packet sniffer tools. Ethereal is an open source tool 
for troubleshooting, analysis, software and protocol development and education. It can capture 
data from a live network connection, or read from a capture file. Captured network data can be 
browsed via a GUI, and more than seven hundred protocols can currently be dissected. A display 
filter is provided to refine data display [12]. AnalogX PacketMon is a fast and simple to use 
network monitor that captures IP packets. It uses advanced rules for filter [13].  Network Probe 
[14] is a tool for traffic-level network monitoring, analysis and visualization. It provides full 
graphical representation and detailed statistics of the traffic and the type of data traveling across 
the network. It allows the user to isolate traffic problems and congestions. It also allows the user 
to search, sort, and filter network traffic information by protocols, hosts, network interfaces, etc. 
There are yet many other similar packet sniffer tools available.     
3. THE PACKET SNIFFER SIMULATOR 
The packet sniffer simulator demonstrates visually how a packet sniffer works in a local area 
network environment, and how data packets are encapsulated and interpreted while going through 
the protocol stack. The packet sniffer simulator consists of a suite of five demos. Demo I to IV 
progressively demonstrate how a packet sniffer works. The  simulation is based on a network 
with two subnets. The two subnets are connected with a router, and each subnet has a hub. The 
first subnet has a star topology and the second subnet has a bus topology. Demo V shows a 
protocol stack and how a data packet is encapsulated while going down the protocol stack at the 
source computer, and interpreted while going up the protocol stack at the destination computer.   
The learning objectives of this packet sniffer simulator are: 
 
a) Explain the differences between a hub, a bridge/switch, and a router 
b) Explain bus and star topology 
c) Explain how a data packet is transmitted in a local area network 
d) Explain the purpose of “promiscuous mode” of a network interface 
e) Explain what a packet sniffer does, and how it works. 
f) Explain the encapsulation and de-encapsulation process of a data packet while going through 
the protocol stack 
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Macromedia Flash MX Professional Edition was selected to implement the demos of the 
packet sniffer simulator. The main environment in which Flash animations can run is web page, 
as a Flash Applet. These animations can also run as a standalone application. The only 
requirement for both environments is to download and install Macromedia Flash Player which is 
freely available.  The following sections explain the five demos, and the network and security 
concepts they demonstrate.    
3.1 Demo I: Direct Path 
Figure 1 shows the user interface of Demo I. Demo II, III, and IV have the same user interface 
as Figure 1. The user interface can be grouped into four components. The top-left component 
“Demo Sequence”, is a textbox that lists the names of the five demos. It allows the user to select 
the demo he wants to view. The top-right component “Description Messages”, is a text-area that 
briefly describes the animation. The bottom-right component shows the network architecture. It 
shows two subnets connected by a router. The subnet to the left has a star topology; the subnet to 
the right has a bus topology. Each subnet has a hub connecting the computers. The computers are 
numbered from 0 to 8. The bottom-left component displays the data for simulation. The data used 
in the simulation is the source address and the destination address of a data packet. Three buttons 
are provided, which allow user to select from loading default data from an input file, or 
generating input data randomly, or entering data manually. The input data are displayed in the 
table that has two columns. Under the first column “From” are source addresses of the data 
packets. Under the second column “To” are destination addresses of the data packets. Under the 
two-column data table, are a “play” button (an arrow within a square), and a checkbox “Play 
continuously”. If the checkbox “Play continuously” is checked and the “play” button is clicked, 
the animation will run from Demo I through Demo IV sequentially and go through all the data 
pairs in the data table sequentially in each demo. If the “Play continuously” button is not checked 
and the “play” button is clicked, it will only show one step of the animation, i.e., the animation 
for one data set. The user can step through the simulation by repeatedly clicking the “play” 
button. At each step of the simulation, the “description messages” text-area is updated to reflect 
what is going on.   
 
Figure 1. Demo I: Direct Path 
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Demo I displays the path a data packet from a source goes through to reach the destination. A 
data packet is represented as an oval shape, labeled by the source and destination numbers. For 
example, Figure 1 shows a data packet, Packet 1-8 moving from computer 1 to the hub. The 
packet will go through the hub to the left, the router in the middle, the hub to the right, and finally 
arrive at computer 8. Keep in mind that, since hub is used in the two subnets, the real path that 
Packet 1-8 traversed is not the same as the direct path. Demo II demonstrates the real path of a 
data packet in the simulated network.   
3.2 Demo II: The Real Path 
Since the computers in the subnet to the left are connected by a hub, all traffic can be seen by 
all computers on the subnet. The same is true with the subnet to the right which has the bus 
topology. A network segment that is not switched or bridged (i.e., connected through a hub) is 
called a common collision domain. Physically, any signal sent across a common collision domain 
reaches all attached computers. The network interface hardware detects the electrical signal and 
extracts a copy of the frame. It checks the address of each incoming frame to determine whether it 
should accept the frame. The network interface hardware compares the destination address in the 
frame to the computer’s physical address (also called hardware address, or media access address). 
If the destination address in the frame matches the computer’s physical address, the interface 
hardware accepts the frame and passes it to the operating system. If the destination address in the 
frame does not match the computer’s physical address, the interface hardware discards the frame 
and waits for the next frame to appear [15].  
Figure 2 shows that, when computer 1 generates a data packet, the data packet is captured by 
computer 0, 2 and 3 in the same subnet. Meanwhile, the data packet is forwarded to the router in 
the middle of the network. The data packet is forwarded to the subnet to the right by the router, 
and all the computers attached to the bus receive Packet 1-8. Only computer 8’s network interface 
accepts Packet 1-8, and the other computers discard Packet 1-8. This is depicted in Figure 3, in 
which the comment “mine” pointing to computer 8 indicates that the data packet is accepted by 
computer 8’s network interface, and the comment “not mine” indicates the data packet is 
discarded by the computer’s network interface. 
 
Figure 2. Demo II (a): The Real Path When a Packet is Sent by the Source Computer 
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If the hub in the subnet to the left is replaced by a switch or bridge, and the computers in the 
subnet to the right are connected to a switch or bridge too, then the path Packet 1-8 traverses will 
be the same as Demo I. By comparing Demo I and Demo II, the concepts of repeater, hub, bridge, 
switch and router can be reviewed.  
 
Figure 3. Demo II (b): The Real Path When a Packet is Received by a Destination 
A repeater is a hardware device used to extend a network cable. It has two ports. A repeater 
receives signal from one port, regenerates the signal and sends out to the other port. A hub is a 
multi-port repeater. A hub receives signal on one port, and regenerates the signal and sends the 
signal out to all the other ports. Repeaters and hubs work at the Physical layer of the OSI model. 
A bridge works at the data-link layer of the OSI model. It examines each incoming packet. First 
the media access address (MAC address) of the sender and the port number through which the 
packet enters are added into the routing table of the bridge. Then the MAC address of the 
recipient is looked up from the routing table to determine which port should the packet be 
forwarded to. If the recipient’s MAC address is in the routing table, then the port number is 
looked up and the packet is forwarded to that port. If the recipient’s MAC address is not in the 
routing table, the bridge sends the signal to all ports except for the one where it was received.  A 
switch is a multi-port bridge. It has the functions of a bridge, but uses a dedicated processor to 
implement the function, so it is faster than traditional software based bridges. A router works at 
the network layer of the OSI model. It uses network addresses (for example, IP address) to 
determine how to forward a packet [16].  
3.3 Demo III: Promiscuous Mode 
Normally, a computer’s network interface hardware checks the destination address of each 
incoming frame to determine whether it should accept the frame. It discards a frame whose 
destination address does not match its physical address. However, a computer’s network interface 
hardware can be configured by software into promiscuous mode, which overrides the 
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conventional address recognition. Once in promiscuous mode, the network interface does not 
check the destination address, but accepts all frames. The network interface simply places a copy 
of each frame in the computer’s memory and informs the CPU about the arrival of the frame [15].  
 
Figure 4. Demo III: Promiscuous Mode 
Figure 4 shows the result of an animation of data packet transmission with Computer 5 
configured into promiscuous mode. When Packet 1-8 was transmitted on the common bus in the 
subnet to the right, computer 5 accepted the packet even though the packet was not addressed to 
it. However, since there was no packet sniffer installed on computer 5 to process the packet, the 
packet was simply discarded by the operating system of computer 5. Notice the difference 
between the “DISCARD” comment and the “not mine” comment. In the case of “not mine”, the 
computer’s network interface hardware discards the data packet because the destination address is 
not the same as the physical address of the computer; whereas in the case of “DISCARD”, the 
data packet is accepted by the network interface hardware but is discarded by the operating 
systems of the computer. 
3.4 Demo IV: Packet Sniffer 
Figure 5 shows the result of an animation when computer 3 has a packet sniffer installed. The 
network interface on computer 3 is also configured into promiscuous mode. When Packet 1-8 was 
sent out to the network, computer 3 captured the package and accepted it, even though the packet 
was not addressed to computer 3. This is indicated by the “mine” comment in Figure 5.  The 
packet sniffer then examines the content of the data packet according to its configuration. The 
packet sniffer can be configured by the user to determine what fields to examine and what 
information it keeps. For example, a packet sniffer can be configured to examine all frames 
originated from a particular computer, or all TCP/IP traffic, or gather general traffic statistics.  




Figure 5. Demo IV: Packet Sniffer 
Consider a packet sent from computer 4 to computer 7. When Packet 4-7 reaches the router, it 
will not be forwarded to the subnet to the left, so computer 3, which has the packet sniffer 
installed on it, will not be able to capture Packet 4-7. Similarly, if the packet sniffer is installed in 
one of the computers in the subnet to the right, it would not be able to capture data traffic going 
through the subnet to the left. A packet sniffer only works in a common collision domain. 
3.5 Demo V: Telnet Over TCP/IP 
Demo V demonstrates how a data packet is encapsulated and de-encapsulated while going 
through the protocol stack. It assumes a Telnet application sending data packets over a network 
with TCP/IP protocol. Figure 6 represents three computers (PC0, PC1 and PC2) connected to a 
hub. Each computer is represented by a rectangle. In each rectangle a protocol stack of five layers 
are displayed. The five layers are: application, transport, network, data link and physical layer. 
The animation shows a data packet generated at the application layer at PC0 being encapsulated 
while moving down through the protocol stack, and being de-encapsulated while moving up 
through the protocol stack at PC1 (Figure 7 and Figure 8). The user can step through the 
animation by clicking the “play” button repeatedly, or run the simulation continuously by 
checking the checkbox “Play Continuously”.   




Figure 6. Demo V (a): A Data Packet Generated by PC 0 at Application Layer 
 
Figure 7. Demo V (b): The Encapsulation Process 




Figure 8. Demo V (c): The De-Encapsulation Process 
 
Encapsulation means that, when the data packet moves down through the protocol layers, a 
header (and a trailer sometimes) is added at each protocol layer. The transport layer adds a header 
that contains the source and destination port numbers. The network layer adds a header that 
contains the source and destination IP addresses and the transport protocol type. The data link 
layer adds a header and a trailer with source and destination physical addresses and the network 
type. And the physical layer converts the frame generated by the data link layer into bits. On the 
destination computer, the de-encapsulation process occurs. The headers (or trailers) are removed 
in reverse order.  
In Figure 8, the data frame is transmitted to PC1 and PC2. At the data link layer, the network 
interface hardware of PC2 recognizes the destination address of the incoming frame, and finds 
out it is not addressed to PC2, so PC2 discards the data packet at the data link layer. Whereas 
PC1’s network interface hardware recognizes that the data packet is addressed to PC1. So the 
frame is forwarded to the operating systems and is further de-encapsulated until it reaches the 
application layer.  
4. RELATED WORK 
Holliday [2, 17] developed a series of Java applets and explanatory material to illustrate key 
computer networking concepts. The applets are: protocol stack applet, error-control applet, 
reliable data transfer applet and media access applet. The Demo V of our packet sniffer simulator 
is similar to the protocol stack applet. The protocol stack applet demonstrates how a message 
goes from the source machine to the destination machine across a router. Whereas Demo V shows 
how a message goes from the source machine to the destination machine and other machines 
connected to a hub. Both demonstrate the encapsulation/de-encapsulation process. The protocol 
stack applet allows the user to specify the sizes of the message and the headers at the different 
protocol stack layers. The Demo V allows the user to step through the simulation or run the 
simulation continuously. 
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White [18] developed a set of visualization tools for teaching a data communications and 
computer networks course. A collection of eleven computer based training modules was created 
as an educational supplement for a textbook on data communications and computer networks. 
Some of the modules demonstrate similar networking concepts as our packet sniffer simulator. 
For example, Module 1 demonstrates the concept of encapsulation and de-encapsulation; Module 
6, 7 and 8 demonstrates the basic concepts of local area networks, and simulate internetworking 
with hubs, bridges and switches.   
The “increasing security in aviation-oriented computing education: a modular approach” 
project at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University [19, 20] is developing interactive modules for 
several topics: buffer overflow vulnerabilities, cryptography, and multimodal transportation and 
Bioterrorism defense. These interactive modules use software simulation and visualization to 
demonstrate security concepts. They may be used by an instructor for classroom or laboratory 
work. Our packet sniffer simulator can be considered as an interactive module with similar 
intention, demonstrating the packet sniffing vulnerability in a network environment. 
CyberCIEGE [21] is a high-end, commercial-quality video game developed for teaching 
security concepts and practices. It is a resource-management simulation in which the players 
engage in planning and construction and observe the results of their choices.  
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The packet sniffer animator demonstrates the packet sniffer and local area network concepts 
through five demos. It can be used by instructors of computer networks and security in the  
classroom. Tutorials and exercises are designed with the tool to help students to gain deep 
understanding of packet sniffer and related network concepts. In [5], six forms of learner 
engagement with visualization technology are defined, they are: 1) no viewing; 2) viewing; 3) 
Responding; 4) Changing; 5) Constructing; and 6) Presenting. We can design exercises so that the 
students can be engaged in the forms of responding and changing. The packet sniffer animator 
can be accessed at:  
http://clayton.ncat.edu/comp476/PacketSnifferAnimation/index.html 
We plan to use this tool in an undergraduate level course Computer Networks, and an Applied 
Network Security course in the Fall 2005 semester. The effectiveness of the tool in teaching and 
learning will be assessed in these two courses. Questionnaire will be designed to collect students’ 
opinion on this tool. The future work will also include the development of animation tools for 
other more complicated security concepts, for example, the Kerberos architecture and distributed 
denial of services, and the assessment of these tools. 
The CAPE and eLMS [22] developed at Vanderbilt University’s Institute for Software 
Integrated Systems are a technology infrastructure for adaptive on-line learning. CAPE is used to 
design how learning materials are used to create an adaptive learning experience, and eLMS is a 
web-based delivery platform. We are interested in investigating the possibility of using CAPE 
and eLMS to extend the Packet Sniffer simulator to create adaptive learning experiences for 
computer network and computer security courses.  
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THE SCIENCE OF INFORMATION PROTECTION 
Daniel F. Warren 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Abstract: The presentation of Information Protection material can be improved in two important ways. First, if the 
material is arranged in a systematic/scientific fashion it can show how all the various pieces fit together 
and it can also demonstrate completeness by showing that all threats are addressed. Second, if each 
protection technique is preceded by a clear description of the threat that it addresses learning is 
significantly enhanced because the protection technique is motivated. This paper presents an 
information threat model that 1) arranges the material in a scientific/systematic fashion and 2) facilitates 
a threat-first presentation of Information Protection techniques. 
Key words: Information Protection, Access Control 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The threat model presented here is based on the following seven threat classes. These threat 
classes are mutually disjoint and together constitute all threats. 
 
1. The Non-Human threat 
2. The Human Error threat 
3. The Authorized Person threat 
4. The Unauthorized Insider threat 
5. The Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data on the LAN threat 
6. The Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data Outside the LAN threat 
7. The Malicious Software threat 
 
1.1 The following sections describe: 
– why most Information Protection treatments fail to be scientific/systematic, 
– why most Information Protection treatments fail to motivate the material, 
– the nature of the threat model, 
– how the model can be used to arrange Information Protection material in a 
scientific/systematic fashion, 
– how the model facilitates a threat-first presentation of Information Protection techniques and 
– why the classes of the threat model constitute all threats. 
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2. WHY CURRENT INFORMATION PROTECTION TREATMENTS 
FAIL TO BE SCIENTIFIC/SYSTEMATIC 
A recent ad for a new information security book announces that the book covers the following 
major themes: (sub topics are also given for each major theme) 
 
Cryptography, Access Control, Protocols and Software 
A scientific minded reader is bound to ponder: 
• Do these topics cover all facets of Information Protection? 
• What are the relationships between these different themes? 
• Is there a significance to the given order? 
In general, Information Security or Information Protection books present topics in a somewhat 
ad hoc manner that does not lend itself to answering these questions. This, in turn, lessens their 
effectiveness as teaching tools. At a minimum every reader would like to know if an Information 
Protection book covers all aspects of information protection.  
The ability to answer this question and the others posed above requires a systematic approach, 
which is a direct consequence of following the scientific method. The Merriam-Webster on-line 
dictionary1 defines “scientific method” as: 
 
“: principles and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge involving the 
recognition and formulation of a problem, ... ” 
 
The lack of a scientific approach is noteworthy, since, we are, after all, computer scientists. 
The periodic table of elements is a good example of a systematic arrangement of information that 
provides answers to these questions. It does list all currently known elements, it does show the 
relationships between different classes of elements (Alkali metals, Alkali earth metals, Transition 
metals, Rare earth metals, Noble gases and Halogens) and there is a significance to the order of 
elements in the table. 
The result of this systematic arrangement of elements is a framework that facilitates an 
understanding of their properties. 
The threat model presented here systematically arranges the various topics of Information 
Protection. Thus, it facilitates learning in the same way that the periodic table of elements 
facilitates learning. 
3. WHY CURRENT TREATMENTS FAIL TO MOTIVATE THE 
MATERIAL 
Information Protection and First Aid are similar in the sense that they are both 
problem/solution disciplines. If a First Aid course is organized around solutions the approach is 
less than optimal and fails to motivate the material. Such a presentation might start with aspirin 
and describe what aspirins do and what aspirins don’t do. It might then present bandages and 
describe what they do and what they don’t do. And so forth. 
This material is better presented if it is organized around the problems. For acid indigestion do 
this and this and this. For bleeding do this and this and this. And so forth. When presented this 
way the student’s interest is first peaked by the problem. “Hmm, how is acid indigestion 
addressed?” Then when the solution is presented it has context and meaning. The student is 
waiting to hear the solution and is likely to better comprehend it because of the context. 
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Currently most Information Protection books are arranged around solutions, like 
Cryptography, Access Control, Protocols, etc. And often the context is ignored. When execution 
domains are presented how often is the threat that they address also presented? If the student does 
not know what the problem is they are not going to be tuned into the solution. From a 
pedagogical standpoint a better approach is to arrange Information Protection topics around the 
problems and then present the protection techniques that address them. 
Since the threat model introduced here arranges Information Protection material around the 
problems it naturally motivates an engaging presentation of protection techniques. 
4. THE THREAT MODEL 
The threat model presented here is based on a collection of seven threat classes that are 
mutually disjoint and together constitute all threats. These classes are based upon a typical 
enterprise computing situation, like the one shown below. This situation includes two Local Area 
Networks (LANs) that are physically far apart so they communicate via a Wide Area Network 
(WAN), like the Internet. The goal of the enterprise Information Protection policy is to protect 
enterprise information from unauthorized observation, modification and denial of availability and 









Figure 1. Typical Enterprise Computing Environment 
Persons that are authorized to access enterprise information (such as employees) are called 
“insiders.” Persons that are not authorized to access enterprise information are called “outsiders.” 
The LAN systems and network infrastructure are assumed to be protected by typical LAN 
physical and personnel security measures. 
This means that information residing on the LAN systems or on the LAN wired networks does 
not need the same type of protection that is required for information that is residing on systems 
and networks outside the LAN or in a wireless portion of the LAN. 
The model refers to information residing on the LAN systems or on the LAN wired networks 
as “information on the LAN” and information that is residing on systems and networks outside 
the LAN or in a wireless portion of the LAN as “information that is outside the LAN.” 
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The seven threat classes of the model are: 
(1) Non-Human threat 
(2) Human Error threat 
(3) Authorized Person threat 
(4) Unauthorized Insider threat 
(5) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data on the LAN threat 
(6) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data Outside the LAN threat 










Figure 2. Graphical representation of the seven threat classes 
 
Examples threats in each threat class are given below. 
Table 1. Examples of each threat class 
Threat class Example 
(1) Non-Human Fire 
(2) Human Error An employee accidentally deletes a file 
(3) Authorized Person A researcher sells some research data to a competitor 
(4) Unauthorized Insider A mail clerk circumvents the file Access Control mechanisms and obtains some 
research data 
(5) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
on the LAN  
Someone in Iceland breaks into the research computer and obtains research data 
(6) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
Outside the LAN  
Someone in Florida intercepts microwave traffic and captures enterprise data that is 
flowing across the Internet 
(7) Malicious Software Someone in Iowa plants a Trojan horse in a music sharing program 
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5. HOW THE MODEL SUPPORTS A SCIENTIFIC/SYSTEMATIC 
TREATMENT OF INFORMATION PROTECTION MATERIAL 
The following table lists the threat classes and general categories of protection techniques that 
address each threat class. Viewed this way it is possible to see how the categories of common 
Information Protection techniques (Passwords, ACLs, Firewalls, Cryptography, etc.) fit into the 
big picture of Information Protection. And since these threat classes contain all threats (see 
section 7 for the proof) complete protection against all threats is achieved if each threat class is 
adequately addressed. 
 
Table 2. Categories of protection techniques that address each threat class 
Threat Class General Protection Measures 
Non-Human (1) Physical Security  
 




Authorized Person (3) 
 
Personnel Security 
Personnel Security (background checks) 
Separation of Duties 
Audit 
Unauthorized Insider (4) Operating System Security 
Identification and Authentication 
File Access Control 
Memory Protection (Process Separation, Rings) 
Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
on the LAN (5) 
Perimeter Security 
Firewalls (Network Traffic Access Control) 
Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
Outside the LAN (6) 
Communications Security  
Cryptographic Access Control 
Malicious Software (7) 
 
Malicious Software Security 
Trojan horses: MAC policies 
Worms: Assurance techniques 
Viruses: Ad Hoc Antivirus techniques 
  
Although the assignment of these general categories of protection techniques to the seven 
threat classes is somewhat consistent it is not perfect. For example, parity bits and backup 
systems, which are used to address Non-Human threats, are not Physical Security techniques. 
Similarly, the cryptographic technique of Digital Signatures (which is part of Communications 
Security) is needed to protect the authenticity of message source information against threat 
classes 4 and 5. And particularly noteworthy is the omission of Physical Security as a technique 
for addressing the Unauthorized Insider. If an Insider can get physical access to a server system 
they can access all its data in spite of Operating System Security (I&A, ACLs and Memory 
Protection). They simply steal the hard drive or boot the server off of removable media that 
contains hacking tools. 
These exceptions do not detract from the threat model, though. They simply mean that the 
names of the general categories of protection techniques (Physical Security, Error Security, 
Personnel Security, etc.) that address the classes of the threat model are not perfect. The names 
listed above were selected because most of them are common terms (Physical Security, Personnel 
Security, Perimeter Security, Communications Security) and they are sufficiently correct since 
they encompass most of techniques that are used to address the threat classes. 
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Since many Information Protection measures are based on Access Control there are a few 
supplementary Information Protection techniques that specifically address failures in Access 
Control mechanisms. For completeness the model needs an additional section that contains these 
techniques. 
5.1 Techniques that address failures in Access Control mechanisms 
The table below identifies three techniques that are frequently used to address failures in 
Access Control mechanisms. 
Table 3. Common Techniques for Addressing Access Control Failures 
Access Control Faliures • Design and Development Principles that Promote a Sufficient 
Degree of Assurance 
• Defense in Depth 
• Intrusion Detection 
 
The technique of system Assurance is presented first. When a Web Server program has a 
Buffer Overflow vulnerability that lets an unauthorized user access the system it is a failure in an 
Access Control mechanism. This may seem odd because we generally do not consider a Web 
Server program as part of a system’s Access Control mechanisms. It is, however. Implicitly we 
expect the Web Server program to not grant system access to unauthorized users. This is typically 
not an explicit policy but it is an implicit policy. When such a program does grant an 
unauthorized user system access it is failing to enforce this implicit policy and hence it is an 
instance of a failure in an Access Control mechanism. Thus, design and development techniques 
that promote assurance or trustworthiness in systems address this type of problem. 
Defense in Depth is another technique that can effectively address failures in Access Control 
Mechanisms. In a Defense in Depth strategy more than one protection mechanism is used in 
series to protect an asset. Two Access Control mechanisms are in series if access to an asset 
requires the permission of both mechanisms.  
A Defense in Depth strategy is optimal when failures of the individual the Access Control 
mechanisms are statistically independent events. When this is the case the likelihood of 
concurrent failures in all Access Control mechanisms is the product of the failure rates of each 
individual mechanism. Typically this greatly reduces the overall failure rate. 
Intrusion Detection is another technique that is commonly used to address the problem of 
Access Control failures. In general, Intrusion Detection techniques look for activities that are 
either a result of an Access Control failure or an unauthorized action, such as port probing, that is 
not easily prevented by Access Control techniques. 
6. HOW THE MODEL SUPPORTS A THREAT-FIRST 
PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION PROTECTION 
TECHNIQUES 
A straightforward application of the threat model to the presentation of Information Protection 
material could simply allocate a section or chapter to each threat class, such as is done below. 




Table 4. Applying the Threat Model to the Presentation of Information Protection Material 
Chapters General Information Protection Measures 
1. Non-Human Threat Physical Security 
2. Human Error Threat Error Security 
3. Authorized Person Threat Personnel Security 
4. Unauthorized Insider Threat Operating System Security 
5. Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data on 
the LAN Threat 
Perimeter Security 
6. Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
Outside the LAN Threat 
Communications Security 
7. Malicious Software Threat Malicious Software 
8. Access Control Failures Access Control Failure Techniques 
 
In order to instill interest in the student the presentation of each protection technique should 
begin with the threat that is addressed by the protection technique. Chapter 4 above demonstrates 
this well. 
Hypothesize a system with no user Identification capabilities and show how an Insider user 
can access information that they are not authorized to access. 
Hypothesize a system with a user Identification capability and a file access control mechanism 
(e.g., ACLs and ACL program) but no user Authentication capability and show how an Insider 
can access information that they are not authorized to access. 
 
 
Hypothesize a system with user Identification and Authentication and a file access control 
mechanism (e.g., ACLs and ACL program) and  
– consider storing the password information in the clear, 
– consider storing the password information encrypted with conventional cryptography, 
– consider storing the password information in a hashed format. 
– Introduce the Dictionary Attack. 
– Introduce the Brute Force Attack. 
– Go over password selection guidelines 
  
Hypothesize a system with user Identification and Authentication (I&A) and a file access 
control mechanism (e.g., ACLs and ACL program) but no process address space control and 
show how an Insider can directly read and write bytes of memory and access information that 
they are not authorized to access. 
Hypothesize a system with user Identification and Authentication, a file access control 
mechanism (e.g., ACLs and ACL program) and process address space control but no ring 
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mechanism and show how an Insider can bypass the file access controls and ultimately access 
information that they are not authorized to access. 
The conclusion of Chapter 4 is that all aspects of OS Security are necessary to adequately 
address the Insider threat. As previously mentioned, Physical Security also needs to be mentioned 
because it too plays a role in addressing the Insider Threat. 
This arrangement of material is starkly different from what is commonly done today. Most 
treatments today have a chapter on I&A, a chapter on file access control policies and mechanisms 
and a chapter on Operating System Security that presents rings. The arrangement above shows 
that all these techniques work in concert together to address the same threat, which is the 
Unauthorized Insider threat. 
Chapter 7 (Malicious Software Threat) above also demonstrates the value of this approach. 
Since Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies are primarily implemented to address Trojan 
horse programs in applications it only makes sense to present the threat (Trojan horses) and the 
protection technique (MAC policies) in the same chapter. 
Traditional treatments obscure the connection between MAC policies and Trojan horse 
programs by presenting MAC policies (along with Discretionary Access Control policies) in a 
Policies chapter and Trojan horse programs in a Malicious Software chapter. When presented this 
way the reader has to make the connection between the purpose of a MAC policy and the Trojan 
horse program threat on their own. 
 
7. WHY THE SEVEN CLASSES INCLUDE ALL THREATS 
The follow figures prove that the seven classes of the model do, in fact, include all threats. 
The proof involves repeatedly partitioning the set of all threats until the 7 classes of the model are 
derived. First, the set of All Threats is partitioned into Human-Based threats and Non-Human-




Figure 3. Partitioning all threats into Human and Non-Human-Based threats 
Then the set of Human-Based threats is partitioned into the set of Intentional threats and 
Accidental threats. Intentional threats are, by definition, performed by Untrustworthy Persons. 
With the exception of Non-Human threats (fires, lightening, etc.) and Accidental Errors all threats 






Figure 4. Partitioning Human-Based Threats into Intentional and Accidental Threats 





Human Errors (2) 
Human-Based Non-Human-Based (1) 
All Threats 
The Science of Information Protection 99 
 
 
Untrustworthy Persons come in two varieties, those that are authorized to access the data and 
those that are not authorized to access the data. Thus, the set of Untrustworthy Persons is 








Figure 5. Partitioning Untrustworthy persons into Unauthorized and Authorized sets 
Unauthorized Persons come in two varieties, those that are Insiders and those that are 










Figure 6. Partitioning Unauthorized Persons into Outsiders and Insiders 
Outsiders can threaten enterprise data in two different places, in the environment outside the 
LAN or on the LAN. Thus, Outsiders are partitioned accordingly. 
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Figure 7. Partitioning Outsiders into LAN Data Attackers and Non-LAN Data Attackers 
 
A seventh threat class (Malicious Software) is introduced because Unauthorized Insiders and 
Outsiders Attacking Enterprise Data on the LAN can attack LAN information in two ways, 
directly and indirectly. Direct attacks are prevented by appropriate Access Control techniques. 
This is due to the nature of Access Control, it grants access to authorized persons and denies 
access to unauthorized persons and both the Unauthorized Insiders and the Outsiders Attacking 
Data on the LAN are not authorized for the targeted data. 
Indirect attacks are generally not addressed by typical Access Control techniques. 
Indirect attacks use Malicious Software to attack “from the inside.” This type of attack is 
so fundamentally different it is broken out into its own threat class. Access Control 
techniques keep unauthorized users from gaining direct access, they do not prevent a 
victim from unknowingly sending their files to a website in Eastern Europe when they 
execute a Trojan horse program. If the victim is authorized to send data to a website 
Access Control cannot address this problem. 
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 Figure 8. Introducing the Malicious Software Threat Class 
Since the seven classes above are derived by partitioning the set of all threats they must 
contain every information threat. As such, adequately addressing each threat class provides 
complete coverage against all threats. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The given threat model provides a systematic way for presenting Information Protection 
topics. Systematic presentations, like the one proposed here, enhance learning by showing how all 
the pieces fit together and by establishing a sense of complete coverage against all threats. The 
use of the threat model presented here also promotes learning because it organizes the material 
around the threats that provides context and necessity for each protection technique. 
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AT JACKSON STATE UNIVERSITY  
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Abstract: In this paper we share the story of Network Security and Information Assurance education at Jackson State 
University. We narrate its start, collaboration with another university, and our steps towards establishing 
a Center of Academic Excellence in this domain.  
Key words: Network Security, Information Assurance, Education, Jackson State University 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The example of the Internet and communication networks in the progress of our lives 
nowadays is water. We cannot imagine our economy, education, communication with others, 
defense, pleasure, etc, without the Internet. E-mail, HTTP, WWW, all are thought nowadays to be 
necessities, although we know for sure that Adam and Eve did not have them! Consequently, the 
protection of information becomes more and more challenging. Accordingly, the interest in 
Network Security and Information Assurance (NSIA) is growing day by day and the latter is 
posed to be in the heart of Computer Science education.  
 
Acknowledging this fact, the Department of Computer Science at Jackson State University 
(JSU) moved into providing NSIA as part of its curriculum. Initially, a network security course 
for undergraduates and graduate students was offered once a year in collaboration with 
Mississippi State University (MSU), Mississippi State, Mississippi. Thus, in spring 2002, this 
course was offered as a distance learning class. Eventually, the course was offered in spring 2004 
by Dr. H. Kettani, a faculty member of the Department of Computer Science at JSU and is being 
offered in every spring semester 
 
Meanwhile, the department has received two generous grants from the National Science 
Foundation to enhance the department’s NSIA program and establish a Center of Academic 
Excellence in NSIA.  As a result, two undergraduate and two graduate students have been 
supported and are performing very well in their NSIA career.  
 
In this paper, we elaborate on the journey of the Department of Computer Science at JSU to 
establish NSIA awareness in its program, our success, and future plans. 
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2. ABOUT JACKSON STATE UNIVERSITY 
Jackson State University (JSU) is one of the nation's largest and prominent 
Historically Black College/University (HBCU) located at Jackson, the capital of the state 
of Mississippi. As of fall 2003, Jackson State University, enrolled 7,815 students. Of this 
total enrollment, 63% are female, 81% are undergraduates, and 94% are African 
Americans [1]. 
The College of Science, Engineering, and Technology at Jackson State University 
provides an excellent opportunity for large numbers of the African Americans, both men 
and women, to obtain engineering education. As of fall 2003, this college enrolled 1,655 
students, which is 23% of the total enrollment of the university. Of this college's total 
enrollment, 52% are female, 87% are undergraduates, and 94% are African Americans 
[1]. 
The Department of Computer Science offers both Bachelor of Science and Master of 
Science degrees. The Bachelor of Science degree program is accredited by the 
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET). The Department of 
Computer Science is also a leading producer of African Americans with the Bachelor of 
Science degree in Computer Science. As of fall 2003, this department enrolled 330 
students, which is 20% of the total enrollment of the College of Science, Engineering, 
and Technology. Of this department's total enrollment, 38% are female, 76% are 
undergraduates, and 84% are African Americans [1]. 
3. COLLABORATION WITH MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY 
Mississippi State University (MSU) has developed a strong NSIA program and is two hours 
drive north east of JSU. Thus, when we were thinking of developing our NSIA program, we 
decided that it would be a good idea to learn from MSU’s experience and collaborate with its 
Computer Science Department. Accordingly, a network security course for undergraduates and 
graduate students was offered once a year in collaboration with MSU as distance learning class. 
Thus, in spring 2002, the course was offered at MSU by Dr. R. Vaughn, a faculty member of the 
Department of Computer Science at MSU and was broadcast to JSU.  In spring 2004, the course 
was offered as semi distance learning class, where Dr. Vaughn alternated between MSU and JSU. 
In addition, this course had a laboratory that was offered at JSU and supervised by two JSU 
graduate students as teaching assistants.  The adopted lab experiments followed the lab manual 
that was developed at MSU. 
4. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION’S SUPPORT  
In response to a National Science Foundation (NSF) request for proposals for a Scholarship 
for Service (SFS) grant, and in collaboration with MSU, JSU was awarded in August 2002 two 
SFS grants of $350,000 for a period of 4 years. The purpose of these grants is to increase NSIA 
awareness on campus. With these grants we were able to support two undergraduate students and 
two graduate students for duration of two years. These students were required to have an 
internship in NSIA domain at a government institution of their choice, and work for two 
consecutive years at such institution after the completion of their degree. We note that the 
students that we supported did not have trouble in finding such internships. In the past two 
summers, we had one graduate and one undergraduate student who worked at the Federal Bureau 
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of Investigation (FBI) at Washington, DC, a graduate student who worked at the Federal 
Administration Agency (FAA) at Washington, DC, and an undergraduate student NASA Stennis 
Space Center, Mississippi. In May 2005, our first supported student has earned her Masters of 
Science and started working at another Government agency.  
The grant also helped in sending students and faculty members to attend educational and 
training conferences and workshops in NSIA domain.  For example, in 2004, Dr. Kettani was sent 
to two conferences organized by SysAdmin, Audit, Network, and Security (SANS) Institute.   Dr. 
Kettani also attended the Sixth Workshop on Education in Computer Security (WECS6). Thus, in 
spring 2005, he instructed the course independently from MSU. The course still has a lab, and the 
enrollment is a dozen to a score of students.   
5. TOWARDS A CENTER OF ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE  
The first step in establishing a Center of Academic Excellence in NSAI is to map the courses 
that we offer in NSIA domain to two standards of the Information Assurance Courseware 
Evaluation (IACE). Accordingly, in February 2004, the Review Committee of IACE has 
validated the mapping at 100% for the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) National 
Standards 4011 and 4014 Entry Level. Consequently, JSU has received recognition and a 
certificate during the CNSS Annual Conference, Norfolk, Virginia, April, 2004. Consequently, 
we have applied to the 8th annual NSA and DHS for the Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education Program Offering in December 2005. 
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TWO SUCCESSFUL MINIPROJECTS IN AN OVERVIEW 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE COURSE 
Judith L. Gersting 
University of Hawaii at Hilo 
 
Key words: Steganography, Information Assurance Plan, Information Assurance Policy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the Computer Science Department at the University of Hawaii at Hilo, we have recently 
introduced an undergraduate Information Assurance course.  This is a senior-level elective course 
for computer science majors, and is intended to provide a general overview of the field. 
Information assurance can be somewhat overwhelming to teach because its scope is so broad.  
It touches on many areas of computer science (programming, operating systems, database, 
networks), as well as mathematics (cryptology), and management, legal, and ethical issues.  But it 
is a very important topic, one in which there is a great deal of student interest and for which there 
is no end of related items to be found in the news. 
Prior to attending the WECS6 workshop I had taught a seminar on cryptography and network 
security, and, later, the first version of our overview course.  I found materials for "talking about" 
lots of things.  But, for our students at least, talking often goes right over their heads and nothing 
much sinks in until they engage in some concrete learning experience.  So I was looking for 
additional topics that I could translate into student assignments or lab exercises, and, based on 
information from WECS6, I had the germ of two ideas. I wanted to do something with 
steganography, and something with security planning.  These formed the bases for two sets of 
student activities/assignments that were incorporated in my second version of our overview 
course, taught in Spring 2005. 
These activities proved relatively successful based on my criteria for success, which were: 
a.  Students learned something that was new to them. 
b.  A "real world" security problem or issue was explored. 
c.  Students found the activities enjoyable. 
2. STEGANOGRAPHY 
I was intrigued by the demonstration on steganography at WECS6.  Steganography  is the art 
of hiding secret information in plain sight, and in various forms, it dates back to ancient times.  
Today it generally involves highjacking the least significant bits of an image file to store secret 
information such as a text file, and with the ready transmission of images over the Web, it is a 
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potential tactic for instantaneously broadcasting secret information in plain sight around the 
world.  
The assignment package I put together on this topic involved the following student activities: 
a.  Students reported on historical uses of steganography. 
b. Students used a free steganography software tool called S-Tools [6], which allows for least 
significant bit encryption of data within an image file.  In a closed lab exercise, students explored 
this tool, answered several questions about how the tool works, and investigated four copies of a 
900 KB image file I had prepared.  Each looked the same; one was nothing but the image and the 
other three held increasingly larger files.   Students were impressed with the fact that a 650 KB 
text file - an entire book chapter - could be embedded in this image and appear quite undetectable. 
c.  I provided information on the BMP file format as background for a programming 
assignment that consisted of three parts.  Students worked in small teams to write (in C++) three 
programs that constitute a simple version of S-Tools to meet the following specifications: 
i.  As a first pass, read in and write out a BMP image file.  The output image should, of 
course, look like the input image.  
ii.  Read in an image file and a text file and encode the text file sequentially in the least 
significant bits of the image file. 
iii.  Read in a steganographic image file containing text encoded as in part ii and recreate 
the original text file. 
d.  In a closed lab session, each team used a BMP image file and a text file of their choosing, 
encoded the text file in the image file, and passed the steganographic image file to another team, 
who attempted to decode it and recover the original text file.  This proved a bit more difficult than 
anticipated because, while each team had tested their programs on their own files, some of the 
programs (either the encoding or the decoding) didn't work correctly when paired with another 
team's program.  To pin down the errors, the teams began trading text and image files and by the 
end of the hour one team still had an encoding error (later fixed) but all other code was working 
properly. 
e.  One student took this project a little farther.  Using two image files, one quite complex and 
one rather simple, he inserted random bits into each image, first randomizing just the low order 
bit, then the two low order bits, 3 bits, 4 bits, up to 7 of the 8 bits, and wrote out the image file for 
each case.  Two interesting observations could be made.  One was that even with 7 out of every 8 
bits mangled, the original images were still discernable.   The other was that, contrary to what one 
might expect, the more complex image absorbed the mangled bits less successfully than the 
simple image, that is, slight variations or degradations appeared visible in the complex image 
with fewer mangled bits than in the simple image.  This little experiment will be included as part 
of the overall steganography assignment package when the course is next taught. 
3. SECURITY PLANNING 
The second assignment package, which came near the end of the semester, involved 
management issues, specifically security planning.  A security plan for an organization should 
address the following: 
 Risk analysis 
 Security policy 
 Who is accountable for what  
 Timeline for change 
 Structure for periodic revision 
 
Risk analysis involves making an inventory of the organization's assets, determining how each 
might be vulnerable, how each might be protected, and the cost/benefit ratio of implementing 
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such protection. The security policy, based on the risk analysis, spells out what the organization's 
security decisions are, what assets are accessible to whom and for what purpose, and what 
protections are in place.  The security plan will also include assignment of responsibilities for 
security measures, a timeline for implementing new security controls, and a mechanism to ensure 
periodic review and revision of this whole process. 
Students may have little opportunity to examine security plans, yet in the business world, 
security planning may indeed be something they are called upon to do. The assignment, partially 
based on exercises found in Chapter 8 of [5], asks students to develop security plans for fictional 
enterprises making use of the guidelines in the OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide, Version 1.0, 
Volume 10 [3]. The OCTAVE-S Implementation Guide can be downloaded from 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/documents/04.reports/04hb003.html 
 
3.1 The Octave-S Guidelines 
The OCTAVE method [1] was developed at the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie 
Mellon University.  It involves specific steps for building a security plan for large organizations, 
i.e., those with over 300 employees.  (More information on the OCTAVE method can be found in 
[2].)  OCTAVE-S was developed later as a more streamlined version suitable for small 
organizations.   
The OCTAVE-S Implementation Guide is a 10-volume series that includes documentation 
and guidance for use of the OCTAVE-S system.  Obviously a complete application of the 
OCTAVE-S system would be a major effort, and training is recommended.  Volume 10 of the 
series, however, is an example scenario of the OCTAVE-S methodology applied to a fictitious 
medical facility called MedSite.  This is the document made available to students for this 
assignment.   
Most valuable in this example scenario are the worksheets illustrating asset identification, 
impact evaluation,  identification and evaluation of current security practices, identification of 
critical assets and their risk profiles, protection strategies, recommendations, and action plans.   
3.2 The Assignment 
Part of the assignment statement given to students follows: 
"Your job is to write a security plan for a fictional enterprise.  Obviously, the Octave-S 
example in Volume 10 is more than is required for this assignment, but you should read it to gain 
some ideas for making lists and/or tables about your fictional enterprise. Your first task, of 
course, is to fill in some details of your fictional enterprise so that you can then identify its most 
important assets, determine in what ways and how likely they are to be vulnerable, estimate the 
costs of that vulnerability, know who is responsible for these assets, and so forth.  Your report 
should be on the order of 12-15 pages, and should be an example of professional writing." 
This was also a team project.  Each team had a different fictional enterprise, namely 
 A credit union 
 A regional airline 
 An electric utility company 
 A political campaign headquarters 
Students had less than two weeks to complete the project. 




3.3 The Results 
This was a very successful assignment in terms of student enjoyment, although they all 
wished they had had more time (and in this case this familiar student lament may have been 
justified). The fictional nature of their enterprises gave the students the freedom to "invent" 
assets, while the worksheet formats from the OCTAVE-S Volume 10 document helped to provide 
structure for their reports.   All team papers were well-written, and used selected worksheet 
formats from the OCTAVE-S Volume 10 document.   
The political campaign team had the greatest difficulty identifying assets.  The credit union 
team thought that their enterprise was rather dull.  The most interesting report came from the 
electric utility company, which early on decided to be a hydroelectric facility, and then found an 
actual risk assessment methodology document applicable to their enterprise [4]. 
By the time this assignment was completed, a graduating student in this course had his job 
offer in hand and had learned that one of his responsibilities was going to be to write a security 
plan for the organization hiring him.   This certainly added interest in this assignment for him, 
and for his fellow students. 
4. CONCLUSION 
My objective after attending WECS6 was to again offer the overview security course, but to 
incorporate more hands-on activities or assignments than previously.  Using material inspired 
from WECS6, the unit on steganography took about 3 hours of class and closed lab time.  The 
unit on management issues took about 4 hours of class time, including time for presentation of 
team reports.  Other material from WECS6 was filtered throughout some of the other course 
topics.  Nothing specific was done for or with underrepresented groups in computer science, 
although the University of Hawaii at Hilo is considered a minority institution.  No publications 
resulted from this work, but new materials for assignments and activities were developed.   
The IA course will be a part of our regular course rotation and will be offered every two 
years.  We hope to continue to develop activities and assignments in various areas to further 
enrich student learning opportunities. 
REFERENCES 
1. Alberts, C., Behrens, S., Pethia, R., Wilson, W., Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) Framework, Version 1.0,  Software Engineering Institute Technical Report, CMU/SEI-99-TR-017, 
1999.  http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/documents/99.reports/99tr017/99tr017abstract.html 
2. Alberts, C., and Dorofee, A., Managing Information Security Risks: The OCTAVE 
(SM) Approach,  Addison Wesley Professional, 2002.                       
3. Alberts, C.,  Dorofee, A.,  Stevens, J., Woody,  C., OCTAVE®-S Implementation Guide, Version 1.0, Volume 10: 
Example Scenario, CMU/SEI-2004-HB-003, 2005. 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/publications/documents/04.reports/04hb003.html 
4. Matalucci, R., Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams, Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management (PSAM6), 23-28 June 2002, San Juan, Puerto Rico, USA, Vol. I, 
pp 169-176.  http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/Workshop_Orlando/RAM-D_RM.pdf 
5.  Pfleeger, Charles P., and Pfleeger, Shari L., Security in Computing, Third Edition, Prentice Hall, 2003. 




WECS6 FOLLOW-UP REPORT 
Charles Anderson 
Western Oregon University 
Abstract: This report is a summary of my educational efforts in the field of computer and network security 
following my attendance at the WEC6 workshop and tutorials.  In other words, what I did after my 
summer vacation in Monterey. 
Key words:  WECS6, Computer Science Education, curriculum, development, infosec. 
1. OBJECTIVES 
My initial objectives immediately following WECS6 were very modest: to enhance the 
coverage of security topics for those classes in which I typically discuss security – e.g., 
networking.  However, during the course of the 2004-05 school year my objectives increased 
fairly dramatically.  I decided to offer an introductory class in security as an unpaid overload, and 
I began to discuss the possibility of expanding our Computer Science (CS) major to include an 
emphasis in security.  In preparation for that, I created a new block of course numbers (460 – 
469) for security classes, and wrote course descriptions for two initial offerings. 
In 2005-06, I am expanding on the curriculum development to complete the specification of 
the new security emphasis.  I will be submitting two to four additional course descriptions for the 
new emphasis.  I am further revising my existing courses with security as a primary learning 
outcome – i.e., when considering topics or presentations, one of my metrics is now “does this 
provide students with knowledge they need to understand security later in their education or 
employment?” 
2. COURSES TAUGHT 
In the 2004-05 academic year, I incorporated security or expanded the coverage of it in a 
number of classes that I usually teach.  I also taught a new introduction to security course.  
Furthermore, as a direct result of the WECS6 conference, I added security to a new class, which 
initially seemed to have little to do with security. 
2.1 Existing Courses 
In this section, I discuss courses that I typically teach and how I’ve changed my presentation 
of security topics. 
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2.1.1 CS 350 – Network Administration – 3 units 
This is a first course in networking aimed primarily at our Information Systems (IS) majors 
(non-programmers).  It is focused primarily on LAN networking.  From the WECS tutorial, I got 
some new ideas for presenting the networking topics (independent of security) from J. D. Fulp’s 
introductory talk – e.g., using a spreadsheet to construct a template to overlay on binary data to 
show the idea of fields within a packet.  This class includes a section on host-based and LAN-
oriented security which was reorganized and greatly clarified based on information from the 
entire workshop.  While teaching this class I had the epiphany that preparing students to 
understand network attacks should be a primary learning outcome of the course. 
2.1.2 IS 452 – Internet – 3 units 
This is the second class in networking, which is focused primarily beyond the LAN.  It is a 
follow up to CS 350.  In addition to general reorganization and clarification of security topcis, I 
applied information and materials that I developed for my Introduction to Information Assurance 
course (see below) to discuss topics such as VPNs and firewalls. 
2.2 New Courses 
2.2.1 CS 459 – Introduction to Information Assurance – 3 units 
This was a brand-new course that I taught as a direct result of the WECS workshop.  Because 
it was new, it was an elective for the students.  Despite the fact that the students were not required 
to take the course, it was one of the largest/most popular courses I’ve ever taught. It was available 
to our more senior CS and IS students – i.e., programmers and non-programmers.  On the first 
day after dealing with the typical administrative chores, I showed the Strategic Cyber Defense 
DVD that we got at the tutorial; the students got a kick out of the video. 
I used Corporate Computer and Network Security by Panko as the textbook.  We covered 
chapters one through eight.  Topics included access control, physical security, attack methods, 
firewalls, host security, and some basic cryptography.  I don’t recall this book being mentioned at 
the workshop, but I found it very useful because it provides a decent introduction to a broad range 
of topics, and it doesn’t dive into cryptography immediately or in too much depth, which would 
be rather challenging for our students.  It has some rough spots that I hope will be addressed in 
the next edition. 
2.2.2 CS 272 – Low Level Programming – 3 units 
This class covers programming in C and assembly language.  It is a rarely taught elective, and 
this was the first time I taught it.  This is a class in which I initially had no intention of discussing 
security.  However, as it turned out, the majority of the assignments were security-related.  Based 
on a talk by Everett Bull at the WECS conference, I got a copy of the textbook Computer 
Systems: A Programmers Perspective by Bryant and O’Halloran and gave the students two 
programming assignments from the book.  The first was the “bomb defusing” exercise that 
teaches the students how to use a debugger and work with disassembled binaries – i.e., reverse 
engineering. The second assignment involved creating stack overflows in a program.  In addition, 
as an exercise in algorithm design and optimization, I had the students write a brute-force 
password cracking program, and we compared the speeds of their implementations.  The idea to 
do this was a result of a talk at the tutorial by one of the CISR faculty (whose name I have 
forgotten) discussing password strength and cracking times. 
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3. CIRRICULUM DEVELOPMENT 
At WOU, Computer Science students select an emphasis or elective sequence as part of their 
major.  An emphasis is composed of three senior-level courses in a given subject area. Based on 
my experiences at the WECS workshop, I began discussing the idea of creating a new emphasis 
in computer and network security.  I did not have enough time to completely flesh out the details 
of the new emphasis during the 2004-05 school year, but I did create course descriptions for two 
new courses.  The courses have been approved by the campus curriculum committee and will 
appear in next year’s catalog. 
During the 2005-06 year, I will be completing the definition of the security emphasis, and I 
will be submitting course descriptions for the new courses.  I am hopeful that these will be 
approved this year. 
Although these courses are nominally intended to be part of our Computer Science major, it is 
my intention to make as many of them available to our Information Systems majors as well.  Both 
majors have separate networking and operating systems courses, but the new courses accept 
prerequisites from either major.  At this time, the only course/topic I see as exclusively for CS 
majors will secure programming because students majoring in IS often choose the major to 
minimize the programming that they must do.  
3.1 New Courses 
Introduction to Information Assurance - CS 460: this is basic survey class.  It will be an 
“official” version of the CS 459 class I taught last year and will cover a similar selection of 
topics.  (The CS 459 course number I used before was just a temporary kludge to be able to teach 
the course without waiting for formal approval of an official course number.)  I hope to make this 
a required course for all CS and IS majors, not just the CS majors who select the security 
emphasis. 
Special Topics - CS 469: this course was added immediately to allow flexibility to offer 
classes in more specialized topics before official course numbers are available.  Once such course 
numbers are available, this course may be used for unique topics or seminars. 
The previous two courses have already been approved.  Our department hasn’t finalized the 
other courses in the security emphasis, but I am considering the following possibilities.  Network 
Attack and Defense: a discussion of tools and techniques for attacking systems and protecting 
them from such attacks.  Computer Forensics: tools and techniques for forensic analysis of 
computer systems. Secure Programming: an introduction into secure programming practices – 
e.g., avoiding buffer overflows, SQL injection attacks, etc. 
4. OTHER NOTES 
In this section, I discuss various little topics related to WECS and my teaching endeavors.  
At the conclusion of my Introduction to Information Assurance class, I discussed the 
Scholarship For Service (SFS) program, and I shared information about the graduate program at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  One of my students, Justin Hoeckle, was very interested in SFS.  
He was accepted to a number of schools, and is now studying at Johns Hopkins.  (He didn’t apply 
to NPS because of desire/need to be on the east coast.) 
With regards to under-represented student groups, our university attracts a large number of 
students who are the first in their family to attend college. Justin Hoeckle was one of these, and 
his success is due, in small part, to the security class he took from me.  Although the state of 
Oregon doesn’t recognize Asians as minorities, they are quite rare on our campus, and one of 
them, Minh Nguyen, took all of my networking classes and the security class.  He was accepted 
114 WECS6 Follow-up Report 
 
 
to Cornell for graduate school but was unable to attend  due to a lack of financial aid.  (As a 
citizen of Vietnam, SFS was not an option for him.) 
I have not developed any significant new materials related to security, other than the usual 
assignments and PowerPoint presentations.  I am considering developing some readings for my 
networking classes because I cannot find textbooks that cover the topics that I want to cover.  
Such materials would have preparation for studying security as a major learning objective.  I have 
not published anything related to my participation in WECS. 
After “dipping my toe in the water” at WECS, I have immersed myself in reading computer 
security books, both for self-education, as well as looking for textbooks for future classes.  In the 
course of this, I realized that computer forensics can be thought of as an in-depth study of 
operating systems and how they represent and store data.  Based on that observation, I plan on 
teaching my advanced operating systems class this spring centered around forensics. 
This interest in forensics has already paid off: shortly before Thanksgiving 2005, I got a phone 
call from Detective William Wiltse of the Salem, Oregon police department.  He is one of two 
detectives on the force working in forensics.  He is looking to develop a new tool for recovering 
fragments of  MPEG movies.  I hope to involve some students in the project, or failing that, I will 
work directly with him. 
Even before his call, I had been considering how to join forces with our campus Criminal 
Justice department and possibly the police academy that shares our campus.  At the very least, I 
would like to incorporate some information about the legal/law enforcement side of forensics for 
use in my class.  A longer term project is to create a computer forensics course available to the 
Criminal Justice majors who lack the computer and networking background of our CS and IS 
majors. 
One issue that was touched on at WECS that I am still working on is the “ethics” of teaching 
classes that involve potentially dangerous tools or techniques (e.g., hacking).  To date, I have 
written a section in my course policy statements about “dual use technologies,” but I still feel 
compelled to downplay my discussion or use of such tools.  In order to be more effective, I need 
to feel comfortable with these topics and tools.  I am hopeful that once our computer security 
emphasis is in place, I can have a rational discussion with campus-level administrators to get 
more official approval of such teaching. 
Another positive item I took away from WECS was learning about using virtual machines like 
VMWare for security work.  Prior to WECS, I knew of VMs, but didn’t think much of them.  I 
saw a number of speakers talk about and use VMWare for security research and demonstrations.  
When I received an offer from VMWare for a free academic copy of VMWare, I jumped on it.  I 
am investigating how to get low-cost access to VMWare for an entire lab of computers in the CS 
department.  In the meantime during my Introduction to Information Assurance course, a number 
of my students used Microsoft’s Virtual PC (which we have free access to) for studying spyware.  
They were very impressed with the capabilities of VMs; Virtual PC made their project work 
much quicker and easier. 
One final thing I learned about from a presentation at WECS (“Teaching Computer Security 
to Undergraduates” by Tikekar) is that our sister institution, Southern Oregon University, has 
started a degree program in computer security and information assurance.  It is ironic that I had to 
travel to Monterey to meet someone else from Oregon, but I’m glad I learned about the CSIA 
program at SOU.  Although I am not working with the SOU faculty, I am able to use the 
existence of the program at SOU to support the need for a similar program at our campus. 
5. SUMMARY 
To summarize the results of my participation in WECS: 
• I am working to create a new security emphasis for our CS majors. 
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• I have taught the first course dedicated to security on our campus. 
• I have significantly refined my presentation of security in my existing courses and had the 
opportunity to incorporate security into courses that I never considered before. 
• I have discovered my own personal niche for teaching and learning: security. 
I am very thankful for the opportunity to attend WECS.  It has greatly expanded my interest in 
and awareness of security and security education.  Because I am not a researcher with a large 
number of grants to draw on, the fact that all expenses were paid was key in making attendance a 






REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CSN 290 
The Creation of an Introductory Network Security Course 
Marina A. Cappellino 
Genesee Community College 
Abstract: Approximately two years ago, I spoke with administration at Genesee Community College about 
attending Network Security training.  The Director of Computing was considering expanding our 
technology programs to include at least one course- if not an entire degree- on the topic of Information 
Assurance (this includes Network and Information Security).   Administration was supportive of this 
new initiative.  At that point, I took the lead in developing an entirely new course entitled an Overview 
of Computer and Network Security. 
The process of developing a course from the ground up was brand new to me.  Some of the questions I 
had to addresses were: what would be considered important material?  How could I boil down the 
masses of information received into a one semester introductory security course?  How would I 
ascertain the level of proficiency of students?  What would be the outcomes of the course? Could the 
material covered in this course be immediately implemented by students at their place of employment?  
Would abuse of college property in the forming of hacking be a concern?  Would administration 
continue to support this effort through sustained funding for training and additional equipment needs?  I 
hope to address these questions and more in the following report. 
Key words: Network Security, Process of course development  
1. INFORMATION ASSURANCE OBJECTIVES FOR THE 2005-2006 
ACADEMIC YEAR 
Upon the advice of the dean and looking at projected enrollments, we decided to offer the 
network security course in the Fall 2005 semester.  This new topics course enrolled 10 students.  
Course objects, as required by a SUNY wide student learning outcomes initiative, were clearly 
stated in the syllabus as follows: 
 
1. Explain at least two reasons why network security is important. 
2. Demonstrate knowledge of basic network security principles. 
3. Identify and describe at least two risk mitigation strategies 
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4. Describe the daily tasks involved with managing and troubleshooting computer security 
technologies.  
5. Document knowledge of how to create a secure computer networking environment  
6. Explain the concepts involving authentication, along with at least two of the types of attacks 
and malicious code that may be used against your network, and at least two countermeasures 
that could be taken against such attack. 
7. Define terms and concepts such as intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and cryptography 
8. Discuss at least two types of scanning and analysis tools 
9. Discuss at least two legal and ethical issues within the field 
2. WHAT WAS YOUR PROCESS IN INCORPORATING WECS6 
MATERIAL AND HOW MUCH OF THE MATERIAL DID YOU 
INCLUDE IN THE COURSE? 
I attended several training sessions, seminars and conferences on the topic of Network and 
Information Security, one of which was WECS6 training at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey. WECS helped me define the topics I would cover in my course and also gave me the 
opportunity to gain a better understanding of Network Security. 
Upon learning that the WECS training included colleagues from four year colleges and 
universities, I was unsure of the amount of relevant information I would receive, which would be 
useful in an introductory community college course.  I felt that perhaps the information would be 
targeted at a higher level.  As I progressed through the WECS training and conference, my 
concerns were alleviated.  There were a number of sessions that directly assisted me preparing for 
my network security course.  Those sessions which presented material beyond the scope of my 
course, were invaluable as well.  They afforded me the opportunity to gain a deeper 
understanding of network security.   As a result, I went into my course with more confidence due 
to the newly gained knowledge.  
While the book I selected, Fundamentals of Network Security by Eric Maiwald, covered an 
overview of many topics, there were certain topics I chose to cover in greater detail.  For those 
topics, I would refer to many of my new resources for the clearest and most concise way of 
explaining the information.  Professor Fulp’s WECS notes were very helpful in the creation of 
supplemental slides on Firewalls.  In addition, his session on Information Assurance Education 
Pedagogy was very interesting and extremely applicable- not only to my network security course, 
but to other technology courses I teach.  I learned some helpful techniques for effectively 
teaching technology and the importance of a solid foundation in the basic concepts.  His notes 
underscored the importance of clarifying for students, the terminology that can get so confusing 
so quickly.  Professor Fulp spoke on the topics of “principle of least privilege”, “hard on the 
outside vs. hard on the inside” and “defense-in-depth” all of which I covered in my course.  
Professor Fulp’s seminars were not the only ones from which I obtained a wealth of 
information and ideas.  I also learned and incorporated concepts from Professor Dinolt’s 
presentation on Cryptography.    Seeing the code for the “I Love You” virus was very interesting 
and made my lecture on IDS signatures easier to understand.  The labs designed for my course 
were a more basic version of some labs I worked with at WECS.  I found the demonstration on 
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Steganography fascinating and incorporated this topic into my class as well- which the students 
very much enjoyed. 
To reiterate, the benefits of the WECS training and conference were multifaceted.  First, 
between 50%- 60% of my course is comprised of concepts I learned at WECS.  I incorporated a 
sizable amount of material into my lectures, demonstrations and labs.  I also obtained additional 
knowledge in Information Assurance from WECS, beyond which I taught in my own course. 
Another invaluable part of my experience at WECS was the camaraderie I gained from 
colleagues of universities as well as colleges in Hawaii and Mexico.  It is important to know the 
expectations of four year colleges with respect to knowledge of incoming students.  I wanted to 
make sure that, in general, the material I hoped to cover in my course would be considered 
adequate introductory knowledge for a student eager to pursue Network Security at the university 
level.  This topic was touched upon in my informal discussions with WECS participants from 
four year colleges and universities.    The information gained and contacts obtained from four 
year institutions will be of even greater importance if Genesee Community College decides to 
embark on a degree granting program in Network Security/ Information Assurance.   
3. ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCES AND SUMMARY 
As mentioned above, what helped me in developing my course was the opportunity to travel 
to a variety of different seminars and training sessions.  Though I ended up with a large amount 
of information at the end of each training seminar, there were certain topics that came up over and 
over again.  These topics, I deemed as especially relevant to network security and made sure to 
cover them in my own course.  Starting out, my quandary was “How do I figure out what is 
considered most important and how do I gear the information received to the intellectual level of 
my students?”  Going to different seminars assisted me in developing answers to that question.  
Through the many seminars, workshops and conferences attended, the administration at Genesee 
Community College has been supportive every step of the way.  In fact I doubt this endeavor 
would have been possible without the sustained support of the college.    
I realize that assessing the different areas of security covered is an ever changing process that 
may take on a somewhat different form each time I teach the course.  What was important and 
relevant in the area of network security even five years ago is completely different than what it is 
today.  I anticipate that some topics I consider important today might not be so in years to come.  
Continued training is even more essential in Network Security than in other areas of technology. 
One concern of teaching a network security course is the potential problem of hacking outside 
of a lab environment.  This semester, our department instituted a policy in which every student 
enrolled in a Computer Systems and Networking course be required to sign a code of conduct 
form.  We believed it was not wise to signal out one course (i.e. the network security course) for 
mandating the signing of a code of conduct form.  Having all students in CSN sign this form, 
helped to emphasize responsible computing for every student, at every level and for every CSN 
course.  We had no issues this semester with abuse. I believe this was partly due to the fact that 
students were well aware of the ramifications of such actions. 
Having completed the course less than two weeks ago, I have no official written feed back 
from students.  Students did however, express enjoyment and informed me that they had gained a 
great amount of knowledge from having taken the course.  In the coming weeks, I will start to 
assess the course and lessons learned and begin to incorporate changes and enhancements.  I 
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